are public records. 58 Read together, various sections of the RTKL provide that parties will see their requests “resolved or be before an appellate court within less than four months [of] the initial filing of the request” (absent an agreed-upon extension). 59 The Commonwealth Court’s unsubstantiated remand significantly undercuts the statute’s aims. First, its approach subjects requesters to the possibility of protracted litigation whenever a court expresses pause about the potential effects of fulfilling the RTKL’s command. ACLU rightly observes that “months or years of further proceedings” may yet be in store before it obtains the record at issue. 60 This would be especially true if, even after remand, the Commonwealth Court again finds itself “unable to determine from the current record whether disclosure . . . would be reasonably likely to threaten public safety or preparedness.” 61 Six years already have passed. If and when appellate review is allowed to serve as a reset button based upon a court’s ill-defined policy concerns, there is no limiting principle, and the judiciary’s claims to neutrality and ordered decision-making vanish. The timely and efficient process that the General Assembly designed cannot give way to a system in which well-resourced agencies encounter no urgency to comply with the RTKL, while requesters deplete their coffers playing Sisyphus. Second, the Commonwealth Court’s remand partially relieved PSP of its statutorily-imposed burden to prove that an exception to the disclosure rule applies. Nothing in the statute contemplates judicial action after it has been determined that an agency did not carry its burden. The Commonwealth Court’s reasoning is eerily reminiscent of the “just and proper cause” inquiry that the General Assembly discarded when it enacted the RTKL. An agency’s attempt to prevent disclosure must succeed or 58 65 P.S. § 67.708(a)(1). 59 Levy, 65 A.3d at 381. 60 ACLU Br. at 18. 61 PSP III, 2021 WL 5356532, at *2-*4. [J-3-2023] - 13