17. Anti-Competitive Bundling and Tying Any Telecommunications Operator shall not engage in any tying or bundling practices that have the purpose or effect of significantly lessening competition. Tying or bundling practices that may have that effect, include, but are not limited to: 1) A Telecommunications Operator in market X, requiring, as a condition for supplying X to another operator, who is a competitor in market Y, that the competitor purchases another service it does not require, or does not want; or 2) A Telecommunications Operator in market X, offering to another operator, who is a competitor in market Y, more favorable terms for buying X that are not justified by cost, if it acquires another service not required by the competitor, with the intention or effect, of raising the competitor’s costs. 18. Predatory Pricing 1) Any Telecommunications Operator shall not engage in any Predatory Pricing. 2) Any Telecommunications operator shall be deemed to have engaged in predatory pricing if it deliberately incurs losses, or forego profits in the short term, with the intention of foreclosing, or be likely to foreclose, a competitor or potential competitor. 3) To assess whether a price is predatory, or likely to be predatory, the Authority shall consider whether the price for the corresponding service, or service bundle, is below cost. If a price is equal or above cost, then the price shall be deemed not predatory. 4) The Authority shall use the Telecommunications Operator’s current year costs, or where available, regulatory accounting costs, subject to reasonable adjustments if these are from a prior year, as the source of information to calculate the cost of a service. 5) When investigating allegations of predatory pricing, the Authority shall use any of the following cost modeling methods to establish the cost basis: a) Long‐run incremental cost (LRIC); or b) Long‐run incremental cost plus (LRIC+), which allows for joint and common costs. 19. Margin Squeeze 1) Any Telecommunications Operator shall not engage in Margin Squeeze. 2) A Telecommunications Operator shall be deemed to have engaged in Margin Squeeze if it deliberately reduces the margin of profit available to a competitor that requires a Wholesale Service, by increasing the price of the Wholesale Service required by the competitor, or decreasing the price of the Retail Service in a market where they compete, or both. 3) To assess whether a Margin Squeeze exist, or is likely to exist, the Authority shall assess whether there is a positive margin between the retail price and the cost of providing the Retail Service. 4) To calculate the cost of the Retail Service, the Authority shall take into account the cost of the required or essential input purchased in the wholesale market, plus the Downstream Retail Cost. 10