Scarborough v. Frederick Cnty. Sch. Bd. 580 517 F. Supp. 3d 569 (W.D. Va. 2021) operations. But given the relative novelty of this Twitter claim, and attendant constitutional considerations, the court concludes that it is better resolved after factual development, not at the motion *580 to dismiss stage. The court will therefore deny Defendants' motion to dismiss the Twitter First Amendment claim as to Sovine and Angelo. plaintiff failed to allege that she was treated differently from anyone else within the jurisdictional reach of the policy). For purposes of this analysis, "persons who are in all relevant respects alike are ‘similarly situated.’ " Frye v. Brunswick Cnty. Bd. of Educ. , 612 F. Supp. 2d 694, 706 (E.D.N.C. 2009) (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn , 505 U.S. 1, 10, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992) ). c. Equal Protection Violation Scarborough has failed to meet this threshold requirement for an equal protection claim. Across three iterations of her complaint, she has never alleged any facts about other individuals engaging in First Amendment activity on the social-media platforms at issue, let alone that Defendants treated any similarly situated social-media posters differently. Scarborough argues in her opposition that she has been treated differently from other parents because they were not blocked on Facebook. (See ECF No. 40 at 4.) But Scarborough would have needed to allege that she was treated differently from other parents who had also posted critical comments on the FCPS Facebook page. Scarborough never alleged anything about any other parents in her Second Amended Complaint. Without those allegations, Scarborough's generalized and conclusory assertion that Defendants' actions violated her equal protection rights is simply not enough to satisfy her burden of setting forth plausible, particularized facts demonstrating unequal treatment. Because Scarborough has failed to plead plausible facts despite multiple opportunities to bring this claim, the court will dismiss Scarborough's equal protection claim with prejudice. As the final aspect of her first cause of action, Scarborough alleges that Defendants collectively violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "by blocking [her] and her comments" from FCPS's Facebook page. (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 26.) Defendants argue that, even assuming the underlying allegations are true, they fail to give rise to an equal protection claim. The court agrees. The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution provides: "No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. "The equal protection requirement does not take from the States all power of classification, ... but keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike." Veney v. Wyche , 293 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). The elements of an equal protection claim are well settled. The plaintiff "must first demonstrate that [s]he has been treated differently from others with whom [s]he is similarly situated[,] and that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination." Kolbe v. Hogan , 849 F.3d 114, 146 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (quoting Morrison v. Garraghty , 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001) ). The plaintiff must accordingly "allege facts which show that the defendants treated [her] differently from others with whom she was similarly situated." Mills v. City of Roanoke , 518 F. Supp. 2d 815, 822–23 (W.D. Va. 2007) (citing Veney , 293 F.3d at 730–31 ) (granting a motion to dismiss an equal protection claim because the B. Count II: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — Violation of Due Process Clause 581 In Count II of her Second Amended Complaint, Scarborough alleges that Defendants violated her procedural due process *581 rights by deleting her comments from the FCPS Facebook page and later blocking her from that page without notice and an 8