- 4 A A that viewing, downloading, printing the offending Words B B from the Websites by users at the IT Dept and ILL constitute C D (b) “publication” to a third party (“Ground 1”); C Ground 2 – Google Inc was not the “publisher”: Google Inc D claimed I have erred in holding there is a good arguable case E E that they are a “publisher” on the basis that Google Search F may not be just a passive facilitator of information vis-à-vis the Autocomplete and Related Search features (“Ground 2”); G (c) H G Ground 3 – failure to consider context: Google Inc claimed I have erred in failing to consider the neutral context in which the Words appeared, and in holding there is a good I F H I arguable case of defamation against Google Inc to seize it of J jurisdiction under Order 11 rule 1(1)(f) and rule 14 of the RHC (“Ground 3”). K L M 7. In respect of Ground 1, Mr McCoy SC submitted that The Duke of Brunswisk v Harmer4 was outmoded and Jameel (Yousef) v J K L M Dow Jones & Co Inc5 relevantly applied, so publication of the alleged N O defamatory material to Yeung’s servants and agents tasked to search/print the Words (ie the users at the IT Dept and ILL) did not demonstrate N O genuine publication of the alleged defamatory Words in the libel sense to P Q third parties, and a stay of proceedings was therefore appropriate. In advancing such argument for the purpose of the Leave Summons, P Q Mr McCoy SC relied on the judgment of McCallum J of the Supreme R R S S 4 T 5 (1849) 14 QB 185 [2005] QB 946 T U U V V