2023). Furthermore, the OSA enables the subject Minister, the Minister of Public Security, to appoint experts to assist the Police in investigations and accompany them during search procedures. These individuals can also be given the power to require a person to hand over any documents or device, provide traffic data, or be orally examined. Such wide powers given to private individuals leave avenues for abuse, and this is emphasised by the OSA not providing for judicial review of the actions of the Commission. The context within which the OSA was introduced to Parliament in the aftermath of the Aragalaya is quite interesting. Critics have said that the Government is “frightened out of its skin” and is therefore introducing the OSA to protect itself from the possibility of another Aragalaya (Pinto-Jayawardene, 2023). Even though the Online Safety Bill was promoted as one that would protect women and children, the true intentions were seen during the Parliamentary debates about the OSA on 23rd January 2024. MP Tiran Alles commented that the OSA aims to protect not just MPs but also their families from “false stories being published on social media” (Column 37, 2024). The lack of a transparent, meaningful, and inclusive consultative process with stakeholders and local groups during the drafting of the OSA has also been severely criticised (Global Network Initiative, 2023). The process was shrouded in secrecy overall, with no transparency around the already rushed process of drafting and passing the Bill into law. In fact, some have also noted that the Government neglected to make mandatory changes required by the Supreme Court determination and instead passed the Bill with a simple majority (Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2024). The OSA outlines four offences broadly; communication of prohibited statements, child abuse using online statements, creation of bots for illegal activities and offences related to prohibited areas. The use of phrases such as “a threat to national security, public health or public order” or “promotes feelings of ill will and hostility”, “maliciously or wantonly gives provocation to [...] the offence of rioting to be committed” and “outrage the religious feelings of any class of persons, insults or attempts to insult the religion or religious beliefs of that class” are vague and overbroad, and therefore have the potential to include expression that is protected under human rights law. It is important to note that even though the OSA came into force in February, the Online Safety Commission which is tasked with its implementation has not been appointed yet. Sri Lankans are yet to see this law in action. However, the discussion thus far is evidence of the undemocratic nature of the OSA’s implementation. The general approach of successive governments in enacting laws that aim to address violence is generally protectionist: there is a protracted focus on harm, and this is further coloured by the cultural politics of Buddhism, majoritarianism, and militarism. Harm is thus defined in specifically cultural and political ways, and the protectionist approach attempts to address harm retroactively, rather than centring the agency and autonomy of the people affected by these harms, both online and offline. The OSA, within the political legal contexts outlined in this report, would have seriously detrimental implications on freedom of expression, conscience, and assembly online. Such regulations will only continue to serve the interests of vested political interests and populist politics and undermine the authority of the judiciary in serious ways. Good faith law-making around preventing harm and ensuring online safety must thus focus on expanding freedom of expression instead of curtailing it, and understanding the role of the online space as vital to civic discourse and political participation. - 27 -