11 services can place a user no farther away than a city that borders the user’s actual location’). Given AF Holdings’s failure to take even these minimal steps, we cannot escape the conclusion that it sought the vast majority of this information for reasons unrelated to its pursuit of this particular lawsuit. See Oppenheimer, 437 U.S. at 352 n.17 (‘In deciding whether a request comes within the discovery rules, a court is not required to blind itself to the purpose for which a party seeks information.”’). Indeed, Duffy essentially admitted as much at oral argument, stating that if, as appears to be the case, 399 of Comcast’s 400 identified subscribers were found to live outside the District, “the 399 likely wouldn’t be named as defendants in this case.” Oral Arg. Rec. 34:32-36. The foregoing analysis applies equally to venue. Under the relevant statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(a), the propriety of venue turns on whether the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction. See Milwaukee Concrete Studios, Ltd. v. Fjeld Manufacturing Co., 8 F.3d 441, 445 (7th Cir. 1993) (“section 1400(a)’s ‘may be found’ clause has been interpreted to mean that a defendant is amenable to personal jurisdiction in a particular forum’). AF Holdings’s failure to establish any basis for thinking the latter exists means that it has likewise failed to set forth any good faith basis for the former. AF Holdings’s sole counterargument jurisdiction and venue may be waived is that personal and that these defendants, once identified, might do so. See Anger, 791 F.2d at 958. Such a speculative possibility is, however, plainly insufficient to satisfy AF Holdings’s obligation to demonstrate a good faith belief that it will actually be able to successfully sue the more than a thousand non-District residents about whom it seeks discovery. As then-District Judge Robert Wilkins concluded in rejecting the same argument, “it defies common sense for the Court to assume