9 proceedings other than the pending suit, discovery properly is denied.” /d. at 352 n.17. Applying these same principles, we conclude that, as is the case when a plaintiff seeks jurisdictional discovery with respect to named defendants, a plaintiff pursuing discovery of the sort AF Holdings seeks regarding unknown defendants must “have at least a good faith belief that such discovery will enable it to show that the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant[s].” CBS, 148 F.3d at 1090. Absent such a threshold showing, there is little reason to believe that the information sought will be “relevant to the subject matter involved in the action,” as Rule 26(b)(1) requires. The identity of prospective defendants who cannot properly be sued in this district can be of little use in a lawsuit brought in this district. And again, as the Court stated in Oppenheimer, “When the purpose of a discovery request is to gather information for use in proceedings other than the pending suit, discovery properly is denied.” 437 U.S. at 352 n.17 (emphasis added). Thus, in denying discovery where there is no such good impermissible faith belief, a court would not be making an “conclusive[]” determination on the merits of the personal jurisdiction question. Anger, 791 F.2d at 958. Instead, the court would be satisfying its Rule 26 obligation to ensure that the scope of discovery is limited to issues actually relevant to the litigation. Here, we think not possibly have successfully sue the Doe defendants in under the District along with the Due GTE New Media it quite obvious that AF Holdings could had a good faith belief that it could overwhelming majority of the 1,058 John this district. AF Holdings concedes that of Columbia’s long-arm statute, which Process Clause governs this question, see Services Inc. v. Bellsouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 2000), the only conceivable way that