436 Peguam Negara Malaysia v. MKINI Dotcom Sdn Bhd & Anor [2021] 2 MLRA fact might be inferred from it. It was an alternative mechanism to prove a fact other than by adducing direct evidence. This presumption would help to identify and prove the identity of an anonymous person involved in the publication through the internet. It was beyond argument that Malaysiakini, as the 1st respondent depicted itself as the host to the publication. By virtue of s 114A(1) of the EA, Malaysiakini was presumed to have published the impugned comments. With the presumption in place, the AG had overcome the hurdle of imputing responsibility for the publication on the 1st respondent. (paras 45-46) (3) It was a well-settled legal principle that knowledge was a matter of fact. Proof of knowledge was always a matter of inference. The material from which the inference of the existence of actual knowledge could be inferred varied from case to case. A court might infer knowledge of a person on the assumption that such a person had the ordinary understanding expected of him in his line of business unless he was convinced otherwise. In inferring knowledge, the court might approach the matter in two stages. First, where opportunities for knowledge on the part of the particular person were proved. Second, there was nothing to indicate that there were obstacles to that person acquiring the relevant knowledge and that there was some evidence from which the court could conclude such person had knowledge. (paras 65-69) (4) The respondents had failed to rebut the presumption under s 114A of the EA. The respondents’ explanation on lack of knowledge had failed to cast reasonable doubt on the applicant's case. On a balance of probabilities, the 1st respondent had also failed to rebut the presumption of publication on the grounds that it had no knowledge of the impugned comments. The 1st respondent facilitated the publication of the contemptuous comments by the third-party subscribers. The 1st respondent designed and controlled its online platform in the way it had chosen. It had complete control of what was publishable and what was not. It must carry with it the risks that followed from allowing the way its platform operated. The comment section at the bottom, which accompanied each news report published by the 1st respondent, was only accessible to third party online subscribers. In this regard, the 1st respondent was aware of its role in posting and publications. It would be expected for the respondents to foresee the kind of comments attracted by the publication of the article on Musa Aman’s acquittal following the withdrawal of charges, coinciding with the unfortunate timing of the press release by the Chief Justice. (paras 74-86) (5) The law was trite and settled that the burden of proving contempt of court lay throughout with the party who made the allegation, in this case, the AG as the applicant. The standard of proof required was the criminal standard of proof beyond any reasonable doubt. The test to be applied was the objective test and not the mens rea test. The only requirement was that the publication of the impugned articles was intentional. Hence, there was no necessity to prove an intention to undermine public confidence in the administration of justice