438 Peguam Negara Malaysia v. MKINI Dotcom Sdn Bhd & Anor [2021] 2 MLRA the point of belittling the Judiciary. It had tarnished the Judiciary as being guilty of corrupt activity and had compromised its integrity in carrying out judicial functions. Such impugned comments, if allowed to continue, would undermine public confidence in the Judiciary. Public interest demanded a deterrent sentence be meted out against the 1st respondent. (paras 148-158) Per Nallini Pathmanathan FCJ (dissenting) (9) Although the impugned comments appeared on the Malaysiakini news portal, it was open to the 1st respondent to adduce evidence to establish that the comments were neither made nor posted by it. Section 114A in no manner imputed guilt or liability on the part of the ‘publisher’. It merely altered the normal course of proof such that it became incumbent upon the presumed publisher to explain why he was not responsible for the content on the internet portal or site. With the application of the section, the only conclusion that could be drawn was that prima facie, the 1st respondent, was the ‘publisher’ of the impugned comments but was at liberty to rebut this presumption. (paras 194-198) (10) The respondents had sought to rebut the presumption by averring to the fact that at the time, and until the subject impugned comments were brought to the attention of personnel of the 1st respondent, the respondents were not aware of the existence, nor the contents, of the impugned statements. There was no evidence put forward to refute or challenge these statements of the respondents. The only conclusion of fact that could be reasonably drawn on the record of evidence was that the respondents did not know, nor were aware of the existence or contents of the impugned comments, at the point in time when they were posted by the third-party commenters. In this context, the suggestion in the majority judgment that all 65 members of the editorial team should each affirm affidavits was not tenable, as the single affidavit had rebutted the presumption. (paras 199-201) (11) An online content service provider like the 1st respondent became liable as a publisher when it had knowledge or became aware of both the existence and the content of the subject material that was unlawful or defamatory and failed to take down said material within a reasonable time. In other words, knowledge of, and consent to, such content was necessary before an online intermediary became liable as a publisher for such content. Awareness of the content was a prerequisite. (paras 253-255) (12) Actual knowledge of the existence and content of the impugned statements was necessary. Constructive knowledge inferred from the surrounding circumstances did not establish intent to publish on the part of the respondents for the purposes of liability under ‘scandalising the court’ contempt. It meant that an online intermediary would only become a publisher from the time it knew the impugned speech. It was only from that point in time that there arose a duty on the part of the online intermediary to remove all unlawful content from its site within a reasonable time. If it failed to do so, it was likely to