Case: 21-51178 Document: 00516474571 Page: 16 Date Filed: 09/16/2022 No. 21-51178 situations where it is not even clear the State itself would consider its law applicable.” Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 382 (1992). Or as one amicus puts it, the Platforms at this early stage may not use borderline hypotheticals involving vile expression to pretermit consideration of “what actually is at stake—namely, the suppression of domestic political, religious, and scientific dissent.” Brief of Amicus Curiae Prof. Philip Hamburger at 21. In short, Section 7 chills no speech whatsoever. To the extent it chills anything, it chills censorship. That is, Section 7 might make censors think twice before removing speech from the Platforms in a viewpointdiscriminatory manner. But we cannot find any cases, from any court, that suggest a would-be censor can bring a First Amendment overbreadth challenge because a regulation chills its efforts to prohibit others from speaking. B. We turn now to the merits of the Platforms’ First Amendment claim. As always, we start with the original public meaning of the Constitution’s text. We need not tarry long here because the Platforms—by pointing to no evidence whatsoever on this point—do not contend that the First Amendment’s history and original understanding provide any basis for invalidating Section 7. The First Amendment prevents the government from enacting laws “abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” U.S. Const. amend. I; see Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (incorporating this right against the States). At the Founding and “[f ]or most of our history, speech and press freedoms entailed two common-law rules—first, a prohibition on prior restraints and, second, a privilege of speaking in good faith on matters of public concern.” Jud Campbell, The Emergence of Neutrality, 131 Yale L.J. 16