664, 665 (Minn. App. 2017). This court reasoned in part that “the statute’s specific-intent requirement—that false claims be knowingly made—ensures that the statute does not target broad categories of speech.” Id. at 669 (quotation omitted). Two other state supreme courts have considered the impact of an intent-to-harm element—or lack thereof—when analyzing facial First Amendment challenges to laws similar to Minn. Stat. § 617.261. Austin, 2019 WL 5287962, at *19-20; VanBuren, 214 A.3d at 812. For example, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected an overbreadth challenge to 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-23.5(b) (2016), which criminalizes the nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images. Austin, 2019 WL 5287962, at *16-20. In doing so, it rejected “the circuit court’s criticism . . . that the statute does not require proof of an illicit motive or malicious purpose.” Id. at *19. The Illinois Supreme Court recognized that most state laws prohibiting the nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images expressly require some form of malicious purpose or illicit motive as a distinct element of the offense. . . . In contrast, the legislatures of four states, including our General Assembly, have chosen not to expressly include “malice” as a distinct element of the offense. Id. In rejecting the circuit court’s reasoning, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that “[t]he circuit court did not, however, cite legal authority for the proposition that a criminal statute necessarily must contain an illicit motive or malicious purpose to survive an overbreadth challenge.” Id. But our supreme court has provided us with such authority, and we are 20