images often consent to their dissemination.5 Indeed, some individuals, beyond merely consenting, seek to promote the broad dissemination of such images, for either political or economic reasons. See, e.g., Debra L. Logan, Note, Exposing Nipples as Political Speech, 41 Law & Psychol. Rev. 173, 179 (2017) (“Some women bare their breasts to advocate the position that public decency laws should treat men and women equally; others confront the stigmatization of their bodies as a form of political theater to draw attention, whether toward or against a political candidate, to advocate a political position, or simply to defend the rights of breastfeeding mothers.”); Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Porn in Their Words: Female Leaders in the Adult Entertainment Industry Address Free Speech, Censorship, Feminism, Culture and the Mainstreaming of Adult Content, 9 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 255 (2006) (compiling views of women in the adult-entertainment industry). In this context, Minn. Stat. § 617.261’s negligence mens rea is problematic. The statute does not define or explain the circumstances that should cause someone who observes an image described in Minn. Stat. § 617.261 to reasonably know that the person depicted in the image did not consent to its dissemination or that the image was obtained or created under circumstances in which the person depicted had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Depending on one’s sensibilities and tolerance of sexual images on publicly available mediums, reasonable people could reach different conclusions regarding the privacy expectations associated with such images, rendering the reasonable knowledge “We now live in an age where celebrities purposely leak their sex tapes to the Internet, hoping they’ll go viral, and thereby garner further fame and riches. Stars ‘mistakenly’ post their nude pictures to Twitter (oops!).” Michael L. Baroni, New “Revenge Porn” Law Is Impotent, Orange County Law., Feb. 2014, at 12. 5 23