After reviewing the complaint, the evidence presented at the formal hearing, and the hearing panel's sanction recommendations, Vice Provost Durham agreed with the hearing panel. The University expelled Yeasin and banned him from campus for violating Article 22.A.1 and the University's sexual harassment policy. In her November 13, 2013, decision letter, Vice Provost Durham found: • Yeasin's “conduct on June 28, 2013 and subsequent electronic communication was so severe, pervasive and objectively offensive that it interfered with [W.' s] academic performance and equal opportunity to participate in and bene t from University programs and activities”; • Yeasin's tweets referencing W. both on and after August 14, 2013, violated the no-contact order and the September 6, 2013, clarifying email; • the combination of Yeasin's conduct on June 28, 2013, and violation of the no-contact order and the September 6, 2013, clarifying email quali ed as a violation of the University's sexual harassment policy, speci cally “unwelcome comments about W.'s body, unwelcome physical closeness, and unwelcome jokes or teasing of a sexual nature”; • Yeasin's behavior threatened the physical health, welfare, and safety of W. in violation of Article 22.A.1; and • Yeasin's conduct “created an imminent threat of danger to W. on campus and unreasonably obstructed and interfered with her learning environment.” Yeasin appealed his expulsion to the University Judicial Board. The Board denied him any relief. With this denial, Yeasin had exhausted his administrative remedies. He then sought judicial review of the University's actions. How the district court handled this matter. After pointing out that the University presented no evidence that the conduct set forth as the basis for the alleged Article 22 Student Code violation occurred on campus or at a University sponsored event, the district court found that the Student Code, as written, did not apply to off-campus conduct. Speci cally, Article 22 of the Student Code stated that the misconduct in question must occur on campus or at University sponsored events. The language relied upon by the University from Article 20—“or as otherwise required by federal, state or local law”—was ambiguous as to providing notice of what conduct was subject to disciplinary action. Article 18, in contrast, provided speci c notice when the University may initiate proceedings for conduct violating federal, state, or local law and that such conduct must occur on campus. Next, given its nding that the University erroneously interpreted the Student Code by applying it to off-campus conduct, the district court found that the University's decision that Yeasin violated Article 22 was not supported by substantial evidence because it failed to establish that Yeasin's conduct occurred on campus or at a university-sponsored event. The district court ordered that the University readmit Yeasin, reimburse or credit Yeasin for his fall 2013 semester tuition and fees that he paid, and pay the transcript fees. However, the court issued a stay order at the University's request. The University appeals the district court's grant of relief to Yeasin, and Yeasin cross-appeals the district court's stay of judgment. The American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Kansas; the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, Inc., and Student Press Law Center; and Kansas State University each submitted an amicus curiae brief in support of Yeasin. We list the pertinent rules and policies. This action is brought as a judicial review of agency actions according to the Kansas Judicial Review Act, K.S.A.2014 Supp. 77– 601 et seq. Parties in an agency action before the district court under the KJRA may appeal the district court's decision to the appellate courts, just as parties do in other civil cases. K.S.A. 77–623. We exercise the same statutorily limited review as though Yeasin's petition had been directly led in this court. See Kansas Dept. of Revenue v. Powell, 290 Kan. 564, 567, 232 P.3d 856 (2010). Contrary to the University's wishes, we no longer apply the doctrine of operative construction or extend deference to an Stay up to date with the latest on the law! agency's or board's statutory interpretation. In Douglas v. Ad Astra Information Systems, 296 Kan. 552, 559, 293 P.3d 723 (2013), × the court held that the doctrine of operative construction has been abandoned, abrogated, disallowed, disapproved, ousted, Subscribe Please enter your email address overruled, and permanently relegated to the history books where it will never again affect the outcome of an appeal. In re Tax By submitting this form, you agree to FindLaw.com's (https://www. ndlaw.com/company/ ndlaw-terms-of-service.html). We Appeal of LaFarge Midwest, 293 Kan. terms 1039, 1044, 271 P.3d 732 (2012). Thus, this court exercises unlimited review on questions of respect your privacy (https://www.thomsonreuters.com/en/privacy-statement.html). statutory interpretation without deference to the University's interpretation of its Student Code. See Ft. Hays St. Univ. v. University This site is protected by Univ. reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy and Terms of Service Ch., Am. Ass'n of Profs., 290 Kan. 446,Policy 457,(https://policies.google.com/privacy) 228 P.3d 403 (2010). (https://policies.google.com/terms) apply. /