No. 15-3047 19 there an offsetting harm of a kind cognizable by the courts from enjoining the sheriff from violating the First Amendment. Turning finally to the issue of remedy: Had Sheriff Dart sued Backpage seeking to enjoin its publication of sexrelated ads, the company’s remedy would have been to seek a judgment dismissing the suit. But Backpage is the plaintiff, and its only remedy is an injunction against the sheriff’s violating its First Amendment rights. As in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373–74 (1976), “it is clear … that First Amendment interests were either threatened or in fact being impaired at the time relief was sought. The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury. Since such injury was both threatened and occurring at the time of respondents’ motion and since respondents sufficiently demonstrated a probability of success on the merits, the Court of Appeals might properly have held that the District Court abused its discretion in denying preliminary injunctive relief.” And so it is here; given the strength of Backpage’s case, the district judge erred in denying its motion for a preliminary injunction, and we therefore reverse the judge’s ruling with directions that he issue the following injunction (which supersedes the temporary injunction, pending decision of the appeal, issued by this court on November 16): Sheriff Dart, his office, and all employees, agents, or others who are acting or have acted for or on behalf of him, shall take no actions, formal or informal, to coerce or threaten credit card companies, processors, financial institutions, or other third parties with sanctions intended to ban credit card or other financial services from being provided to Backpage.com.