Price v. City of N.Y. 15 Civ. 5871 (KPF) (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 25, 2018) that becomes final from six months to one year after it is accepted, provided the court does not decide, on the prosecutor's motion, to restore the case to its calendar in the interest of justice." (citation omitted)). An ACD precludes any claim for malicious prosecution because, under New York law, it is not a "favorable termination" of the criminal proceedings. See Fulton, 289 F.3d at 196; Hollender v. Trump Vill. Co-op, Inc., 58 N.Y.2d 420, 425-26 (1983). But Plaintiff alleges that her criminal charge remained pending for almost six years after her initial appearance in criminal court. This suggests that the final disposition was not an ACD. The City Defendants did not address this issue in their motion, and the Court need not resolve it at this point. The parties may nevertheless wish to explore this issue in discovery. 2. First Amendment Claims Against Brooks, Obe, Pierre-Louis, and the City of New York The Court next considers Plaintiff's First Amendment claims, beginning with the individual-capacity claims asserted against Brooks and Obe, the operators of the City's @NYCagainstabuse and @NYPD28Pct Twitter accounts (the "official accounts" or "official Twitter accounts"), respectively. 24 23 In this case, the City Defendants do not dispute that Brooks and Obe acted under color of law when moderating the official Twitter accounts and ultimately blocking Plaintiff from viewing or otherwise interacting with them. To the contrary, as set forth below in more detail, the City Defendants explicitly argue that Brooks and Obe were engaged in "government speech." (Def. Br. 9-12). The Court therefore concludes that Brooks and Obe were "state actors" for the purposes of establishing liability under § 1983. *23 feeds and from interacting with them under her own account — in response to Plaintiff's tweets that were critical of the City's handling of domestic violence cases, including her own case. After careful consideration, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has adequately pleaded facts showing that Brooks and Obe violated her First Amendment rights. Before delving too deeply into its First Amendment analysis, the Court pauses to acknowledge the comprehensive analysis undertaken by Judge Buchwald in Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University v. Trump, — F. Supp. 3d —, No. 17 Civ. 5205 (NRB), 2018 WL 2327290 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2018). The Trump decision arose in the context of cross-motions for summary judgment; it thus necessarily implicated a different factual record and different legal standards than the instant case. Nonetheless, the analysis offers a useful primer. Judge Buchwald first considered whether the individual plaintiffs in that case, who had been blocked from the President's Twitter account because of the political views each had expressed, had engaged in political speech, and concluded quickly that they had. 2018 WL 2327290, at *13. She then considered whether forum analysis applied to the President's Twitter account, prefacing the analysis as follows: We can therefore reject, at the outset, any contention that the @realDonaldTrump account as a whole is the *24 The issue in this case is whether Brooks and Obe violated Plaintiff's First Amendment rights by blocking her on Twitter — thereby preventing her from viewing two of the City's official Twitter 11