[126] In short, not all counter-speech is of equal value (R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 about whether a defamation action brought as a result should be dismissed before trial under s. 4 of the Protection of Public Participation Act, S.B.C. 2019, c. 3 (“PPPA”). [127] Public debates on contentious issues can lend themselves to the use of intemperate, offensive or harsh language aimed at discrediting one’s opponent (Keegstra, at p. 832, per McLachlin J. (as she then was), dissenting). Although freedom of expression protects such language, the protection it offers is not absolute. It is limited by, among other things, one’s right to the protection of one’s reputation (Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, at paras. 102-6; Bou Malhab v. Diffusion Métromédia CMR inc., 2011 SCC 9, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 214, at para. 17). [128] As with freedom of expression, our law’s protection of reputation is anchored in the notion of human dignity that underlies the rights guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Hill, at paras. 120-21; see also Gilles E. Néron Communication Marketing Inc. v. Chambre des notaires du Québec, 2004 SCC 53, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 95, at paras. 52-53). While not a freestanding right, respect for one’s reputation is essential to participation in society (R. v. Lucas, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 439, at para. 48, per Cory J.). Thus, there is a strong societal interest in ensuring that individuals can protect their good reputation, as a “reputation tarnished by libel can seldom regain its former lustre” (Hill, at para. 108). 2023 SCC 14 (CanLII) S.C.R. 697, at pp. 760-61). This is an appeal about defamatory counter-speech and