allegations have permeated public discourse in a way that well exceeds their narrow were an expression of H’s beliefs based on his own interpretation of N’s statements. Finally, the chambers judge did not err in his malice assessment. A finding of a subjective honest belief negates the possibility of finding malice; such a finding can be based on the thrust of the defendant’s evidence, read as a whole. Ultimately, the chambers judge found that H’s affidavit made it clear that he honestly believed the views he espoused, and he was entitled to do so. Per Côté J. (dissenting): The appeal should be dismissed. The question is not whether the Court agrees with either party’s expression, but whether N’s action should be dismissed at this early stage of the proceeding. It should not. N deserves to have his day in court. There is disagreement with the structure of the majority’s analysis, which begins with the public interest weighing exercise and then examines the validity of H’s fair comment defence. That is not how the analysis must be conducted. When an application is brought under s. 4 of the PPPA, the plaintiff in the proceeding must first overcome a merits-based hurdle by demonstrating that there are grounds to believe that the proceeding has substantial merit and demonstrating that there are grounds to believe that the applicant under the PPPA has no valid defence in the proceeding. Only then should the court conduct the public interest weighing exercise mandated by s. 4(2)(b), which is the final step of the analysis. In asserting that the order in which a judge 2023 SCC 14 (CanLII) meaning within the legal system. It is clear, when read in context, that H’s statements