In addition, amicus curiae contend that “actual malice” is required to punish false statements regarding matters of public concern because it is not “permissible to jail people under a lesser showing than that required to collect punitive damages from them.” We agree. With matters of public concern, civil defamation liability cannot be imposed without some showing of fault and recovery of presumed damages cannot be permitted on less than a showing of the New York Times actual malice standard. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-49, 94 S. Ct. at 3010-11; see Culliton v. Mize, 403 N.W.2d 853, 856 (Minn. App. 1987) (“If the alleged defamation relates to public officials on an issue of public concern, the New York Times protections attach no matter what the defendant’s status.”). Attaching criminal liability to statements of public concern made without a showing of actual malice would chill free political discussion. See State v. Jude, 554 N.W.2d 750, 753 (Minn. App. 1996) (“A criminal sanction may not be imposed for political speech that does not meet the N.Y. Times ‘actual malice’ standard.”). And requiring proof of actual malice for issues of public concern is consistent with “the privilege for the citizencritic of the government, necessary to the maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsible to the will of the people.” Jadwin, 367 N.W.2d at 482. In sum, section 609.765 is overbroad because it does not exempt truthful statements from prosecution and, as applied to matters of public concern, does not require the state to prove “actual malice” before imposing liability. 9