18 We also determined that the Commission had “adequately supported and explained its conclusion that, absent rules such as those set forth in the [2010 Open Internet Order], broadband providers represent[ed] a threat to Internet openness and could act in ways that would ultimately inhibit the speed and extent of future broadband deployment.” Id. at 645. For example, the Commission noted that “broadband providers like AT & T and Time Warner have acknowledged that online video aggregators such as Netflix and Hulu compete directly with their own core video subscription service,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted), and that, even absent direct competition, “[b]roadband providers . . . have powerful incentives to accept fees from edge providers, either in return for excluding their competitors or for granting them prioritized access to end users,” id. at 645–46. Importantly, moreover, the Commission found that “broadband providers have the technical . . . ability to impose such restrictions,” noting that there was “little dispute that broadband providers have the technological ability to distinguish between and discriminate against certain types of Internet traffic.” Id. at 646. The Commission also “convincingly detailed how broadband providers’ [gatekeeper] position in the market gives them the economic power to restrict edge-provider traffic and charge for the services they furnish edge providers.” Id. Although the providers’ gatekeeper position would have brought them little benefit if end users could have easily switched providers, “we [saw] no basis for questioning the Commission’s conclusion that end users [were] unlikely to react in this fashion.” Id. The Commission “detailed . . . thoroughly . . . the costs of switching,” and found that “many end users may have no option to switch, or at least face very limited options.” Id. at 647. Finally, we explained that although some record evidence supported Verizon’s insistence that the order would have a