19 detrimental effect on broadband deployment, other record evidence suggested the opposite. Id. at 649. The case was thus one where “‘the available data do[] not settle a regulatory issue and the agency must then exercise its judgment in moving from the facts and probabilities on the record to a policy conclusion.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52 (1983)). The Commission, we concluded, had “offered ‘a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” Id. (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 52). We nonetheless vacated the anti-blocking and antidiscrimination rules because they unlawfully subjected broadband providers to per se common carrier treatment. Id. at 655, 658–59. As we explained, the Communications Act provides that “[a] telecommunications carrier shall be treated as a common carrier . . . only to the extent that it is engaged in providing telecommunications services.” Id. at 650 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 153(51)). The Commission, however, had classified broadband not as a telecommunications service, but rather as an information service, exempt from common carrier regulation. Id. Because the anti-blocking and antidiscrimination rules required broadband providers to offer service indiscriminately—the common law test for a per se common carrier obligation—they ran afoul of the Communications Act. See id. at 651–52, 655, 658–59. We upheld the transparency rule, however, because it imposed no per se common carrier obligations on broadband providers. Id. at 659. D. A few months after our decision in Verizon, the Commission issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to “find the best approach to protecting and promoting Internet