26 KABLIS v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT 85. Such interference will constitute a breach of Article 10 unless it is “prescribed by law”, pursues one or more of the legitimate aims referred to in Article 10 § 2 and is “necessary in a democratic society” to achieve those aims. The Court considers that in the present case the questions of compliance with the law and of the existence of a legitimate aim cannot be dissociated from the question of whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society” (see, for similar reasoning, Nemtsov v. Russia, no. 1774/11, § 75, 31 July 2014). The Court will therefore examine them together below. 86. The Court observes at the outset that the contested measure had a basis in section 15.3 of the Information Act (see paragraph 36 above), which allowed the Prosecutor General or his deputies to order the blocking of a website or webpage containing calls for, among other things, participation in public events held in breach of the established procedure. 87. According to the domestic courts, the purpose of the blocking measure was to prevent breaches of law in the sphere of distribution of information (see paragraph 23 above) and also to prevent violations of public order (see paragraph 25 above). As regards the second aim, the Court reiterates that exceptions to freedoms of association and assembly must be narrowly interpreted, such that the enumeration of them is strictly exhaustive and the definition of them necessarily restrictive (see Sidiropoulos and Others v. Greece, 10 July 1998, §§ 38 and 39, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-IV, and Svyato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, no. 77703/01, § 132, 14 June 2007). It notes that, unlike some other Articles of the Convention, neither Article 10 nor Article 11 allows for restrictions aimed at maintenance, or protection, of public order (see Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27510/08, §§ 146-51, ECHR 2015 (extracts)). Indeed, the Government did not rely on that aim. 88. As regards the Government’s argument that the aim of the measure was to prevent breaches of law in the sphere of distribution of information, they did not explain which of the legitimate aims listed in the second paragraph of Article 10 that corresponded to. It has never been claimed that the public event advertised by the applicant in his blog and his social networking account presented a risk to public safety or was capable of leading to public disorder or crime. The aims of the protection of public safety and prevention of disorder or crime are therefore clearly not relevant to the present case. The aim of preventing disclosure of information received in confidence is not relevant either. It therefore appears that the only aim of the blocking measure was to enforce the rules governing public events and, in particular, the circulation of information about them. The Court has already found that enforcement of rules governing public assemblies cannot become an end in itself (see Primov and Others v. Russia, no. 17391/06, § 118, 12 June 2014, and Lashmankin and Others,