-5- A A further no issue before the Commissioner or the Board or before us as to B C As to Question (3), “personal data” is defined in section 2 of C the PDPO. The prohibition in DPP 3 is directed at the use of personal data D 11. D B whether voice could or could not be a personal data. without the consent of the data subject for a purpose different from the E original collection purpose or directly related purpose. F G Neither the statutory definition nor DPP 3 requires the personal data to be private in E F nature or not ascertainable from other sources or not publicly available. G There is similarly no requirement that the use of the personal data has to be H I objectionable to a reasonable man. In the premises and having regard to H the purpose of PDPO, namely, to protect personal data, the applicant’s I argument that personal data that is publicly available and/or use of personal J K L data that is not objectionable to a reasonable man ought to fall outside the scope of the PDPO is unarguable. 12. J K Question (3) also raises a challenge that the PDPO infringes L the freedom of speech, of the press and of publication under Article 27 of M the Basic Law and freedom of opinion and expression under Article 16 of N the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBORO”). It is M N trite law that the rights guaranteed by Article 27 of the Basic Law and O Article 16 of the HKBORO are not absolute; they may be validly restricted P Q where it is necessary and not disproportionate: see Leung Kwok Hung & O P Others v HKSAR [2005] 8 HKCFAR 229 and Article 16(3) of HKBORO. Q Chung J had concluded there was no infringement of Article 27 of the R S Basic Law and Article 16 of the HKBORO (see paragraphs 15 to 17 of the R Judgment dated 23 December 2011). The applicant has not demonstrated S why the prohibition under DPP 3 of the PDPO is an impermissible T T U U V V