by deceiving the plaintiffs’ browsers into thinking the cookiesetting entity was a first-party website. It is not unimaginable that the Wiretap Act would give legal effect to the fraudulent participation of a party to a conversation.75 It is, after all, a wiretapping statute.76 Indeed, it appears the absence of an equitable exception to § 2511(2)(d) is no accident. In United States v. Pasha, the Seventh Circuit held that a police officer who impersonated the intended recipient of a phone call did not violate the Wiretap Act.77 And, as the Sixth Circuit has explained: When amending the federal [W]iretap [A]ct in 1968 to its current state, Congress specifically mentioned Pasha in its discussions of the “party to the communication” provision. In discussing § 2511(2)(c), which is in pari materia with § 2511(2)(d) and differs from that provision only in that § 2511(2)(c) applies to persons acting under color of law, the Senate Judiciary Committee stated: 75 Cf. Desnick v. Am. Broad. Companies, Inc., 44 F.3d 1345, 1352 (7th Cir. 1995) (“The law’s willingness to give effect to consent procured by fraud is not limited to the tort of trespass.”). 76 See Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining “wiretapping” as “electronic or mechanical eavesdropping”). 77 333 F.2d 193, 198 (7th Cir. 1964). 37