bear functional analogues to this process, in that different portions of a queried URL may serve to convey different messages to different audiences. For instance, the domain name portion of the URL—everything before the “.com”— instructs a centralized web server to direct the user to a particular website, but post-domain name portions of the URL are designed to communicate to the visited website which webpage content to send the user.49 As stated above, we agree with the Surveillance Court that routing information and content are not mutually exclusive categories. And between the information revealed by highly detailed URLs and their functional parallels to postcut-through digits, we are persuaded that—at a minimum— some queried URLs qualify as content.50 Indeed, the 49 See generally Jonathan Mayer, Web Browsing (Under the Pen Register Act and Wiretap Act), (Nov. 28, 2014). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7vFha-af7GE 50 We need not make a global determination as to what is content, and why, in the context of queried URLs. Lack of consensus, the complexity and rapid pace of change associated with the delivery of modern communications, and the facileness of direct analogy to mail and telephone cases counsel the utmost care in considering what is, and what is not, “content” in the context of web queries. Indeed, when it comes to differentiating content from non-content, Professor Kerr describes queried URLs as “the most difficult and discussed case.” Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1005, 1030 n. 93 (2010); see also Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law after the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother that Isn’t, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 607, 644-48 (2003); cf. Tokson, 26