03/02/2020 G.R. No. 203335 different laws define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one does not bar prosecution of the other although both offenses arise from the same fact, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other.74 With the exception of the crimes of online libel and online child pornography, the Court would rather leave the determination of the correct application of Section 7 to actual cases. Online libel is different. There should be no question that if the published material on print, said to be libelous, is again posted online or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the subject of two separate libels. The two offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and the other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the same elements and are in fact one and the same offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims that online libel under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one already punished under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4) merely establishes the computer system as another means of publication.75 Charging the offender under both laws would be a blatant violation of the proscription against double jeopardy.76 The same is true with child pornography committed online. Section 4(c)(2) merely expands the ACPA’s scope so as to include identical activities in cyberspace. As previously discussed, ACPA’s definition of child pornography in fact already covers the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means." Thus, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) and ACPA would likewise be tantamount to a violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Section 8 of the Cybercrime Law Section 8 provides: Sec. 8. Penalties. — Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Sections 4(a) and 4(b) of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos (Ph₱200,000.00) up to a maximum amount commensurate to the damage incurred or both. Any person found guilty of the punishable act under Section 4(a)(5) shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of not more than Five hundred thousand pesos (Ph₱500,000.00) or both. If punishable acts in Section 4(a) are committed against critical infrastructure, the penalty of reclusion temporal or a fine of at least Five hundred thousand pesos (Ph₱500,000.00) up to maximum amount commensurate to the damage incurred or both, shall be imposed. Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(1) of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos (Ph₱200,000.00) but not exceeding One million pesos (Ph₱1,000,000.00) or both. Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(2) of this Act shall be punished with the penalties as enumerated in Republic Act No. 9775 or the "Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009:" Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775, if committed through a computer system. Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(3) shall be punished with imprisonment of arresto mayor or a fine of at least Fifty thousand pesos (Ph₱50,000.00) but not exceeding Two hundred fifty thousand pesos (Ph₱250,000.00) or both. Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 5 shall be punished with imprisonment one (1) degree lower than that of the prescribed penalty for the offense or a fine of at least One hundred thousand pesos (Ph₱100,000.00) but not exceeding Five hundred thousand pesos (Ph₱500,000.00) or both. Section 8 provides for the penalties for the following crimes: Sections 4(a) on Offenses Against the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability of Computer Data and Systems; 4(b) on Computer-related Offenses; 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices; when the crime punishable under 4(a) is committed against critical infrastructure; 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; 4(c) (2) on Child Pornography; 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications; and Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting, and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative prerogative. Here the legislature prescribed a measure of severe penalties for what it regards as deleterious cybercrimes. They appear proportionate to the evil sought to be punished. The power to determine penalties for offenses is not diluted or improperly wielded simply because at some prior time the act or omission was but an element of another offense or might just have been connected with another crime.77 Judges and magistrates can only interpret and apply them and have no authority to modify or revise their range as determined by the legislative department. The courts should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body.78 Section 12 of the Cybercrime Law Section 12 provides: Sec. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. — Law enforcement authorities, with due cause, shall be authorized to collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time associated with specified communications transmitted by means of a computer system. Traffic data refer only to the communication’s origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or type of underlying service, but not content, nor identities. All other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will require a court warrant. Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law enforcement authorities in the collection or recording of the above-stated information. The court warrant required under this section shall only be issued or granted upon written application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and the showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed, or is being committed, or is about to be committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence that will be obtained is essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available for obtaining such evidence. Petitioners assail the grant to law enforcement agencies of the power to collect or record traffic data in real time as tending to curtail civil liberties or provide opportunities for official abuse. They claim that data showing where digital messages come from, what kind they are, and where they are destined need not be incriminating to their senders or recipients before they are to be protected. Petitioners invoke the right of every individual to privacy and to be protected from government snooping into the messages or information that they send to one another. The first question is whether or not Section 12 has a proper governmental purpose since a law may require the disclosure of matters normally considered private but then only upon showing that such requirement has a rational relation to the purpose of the law,79 that there is a compelling State interest behind the law, and that the provision itself is narrowly drawn.80 In assessing regulations affecting privacy rights, courts should balance the legitimate concerns of the State against constitutional guarantees.81 https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/feb2014/gr_203335_2014.html 11/19