criminal punishment by recognizing publicity even in private conversations between individuals, thereby excessively discouraged the freedom of expression. The Majority Opinion has attempted to broadly recognize publicity stipulated in Article 310 of the Criminal Act for the freedom of expression, but this cannot be the fundamental solution to the problem and the order is inverted. In other words, strict interpretation regarding the scope of publicity in consideration of the purpose of the provision on publicity as referred to in criminal defamation should be a priority. The Majority Opinion intend to broadly view justifications stipulated in Article 310 of the Criminal Act for the purpose of achieving harmony with the freedom of expression after viewing that even an act of expression performed in a private relationship and space to protect an individual’s reputation corresponds to constituent elements. However, this also culminates in leaning toward the protection of an individual’s reputation and reveals nothing beyond evasion to maintain the theory of propagation possibility. No matter how broadly justifications stipulated in Article 310 of the Criminal Act are viewed, the remark ought to be punished as criminal defamation unless there is publicity in its main purpose and contents. Not only is there a question about how many cases where a private conversation in a private space has publicity exist, but requiring publicity is the same as prohibiting private conversations regarding personal subjects. The entire nation cannot avoid criminal punishment except wishing for good luck that the contents of private conversations are not revealed to the victim. This leads to viewing the entire nation as either potential criminals or those who have not yet been detected. Freedom of expression can be restricted with regard to remarks harming the public interest, but it cannot be seen that freedom of expression is allowed solely for the public interest. However, the theory of propagation possibility adopted by the Majority Opinion leads to the result that freedom of expression can be seen to be allowed solely for the public interest (only in cases where the main purpose is for a public interest even though the motive for the private interest is subordinately included). This must not change the result unless the theory of propagation possibility is relinquished no matter how broadly the scope of the public interest is recognized. J. In light of such legal principles, the judgment of the lower court regarding defamation is examined.