Judgment Approved by the court for handing down. R (Bridges) -v- CC South Wales & ors 39. Having cited the general principles summarised by Lord Sumption in R (Catt) v Association of Chief Police Officers [2015] UKSC 9, [2015] AC 1065 at [11] to [14] and R (P) v Secretary of State for Justice and Another (also known as In re Gallagher) [2019] UKSC 3, [2020] AC 185, at [16] to [31] applicable to the “in accordance with the law” standard for the purposes of Article 8(2), the Divisional Court held (at [84]) that there is a clear and sufficient legal framework governing whether, when and how AFR Locate may be used, comprising (in addition to the common law): (1) primary legislation, (2) secondary legislative instruments in the form of codes of practice issued under primary legislation, and (3) SWP’s own local policies. 40. As to primary legislation, the Divisional Court referred to the DPA 2018 (which they said they focused on rather than the DPA 1998 only for the sake of convenience). They said (at [85]) that it embeds key safeguards which apply to all processing of personal data, including the biometric data processed when AFR Locate is used. They referred, in particular, to the provisions in Part 3 of the DPA 2018. They observed (at [88]) that the requirements arising under the DPA 2018 are mirrored in the Code of Practice on the Management of Police Information, issued by the College of Policing under section 39A of the Police Act 1996, and that section 39A(7) of the 1996 Act requires chief police officers to have regard to that Code. 41. As to the second element of the framework, the Divisional Court said (at [91]) that they agreed with the overall submission of the Surveillance Camera Commissioner that the Surveillance Camera Code of Practice, issued by the Home Secretary pursuant to section 30 of the PFA 2012 and to which a chief officer of police must have regard, provides a full system approach to the regulation of surveillance camera systems, as it provides the legal and good practice standard which the Government expects, as well as highlighting the broader spectrum of legislative requirements which apply. 42. As to the third element of the framework, SWP’s own policies as to the use of AFR Locate, the Divisional Court said (at [92]) that the three relevant policies are (1) SWP’s Standard Operating Procedure, (2) SWP’s Deployment Reports and (3) SWP’s Policy on Sensitive Processing. 43. The Divisional Court concluded (at [96]) that, drawing everything together, the cumulative effect of (1) the provisions of the DPA, (2) the Surveillance Camera Code of Practice and (3) SWP’s own policy documents, is that the interference with the rights in Article 8(1) which is consequent on SWP’s use of AFR Locate, occurs within a legal framework that is sufficient to satisfy the “in accordance with the law” requirement in Article 8(2); and that the answer to the primary submissions of the Appellant (and the Information Commissioner who supported him on this issue) is that it is neither necessary nor practical for legislation to define the precise circumstances in which AFR Locate may be used, e.g. to the extent of identifying precisely which offences might justify inclusion on a watchlist as a subject of interest or precisely what the sensitivity settings should be. 44. The Divisional Court then turned to the question of whether the interference of AFR Locate with Article 8(1) satisfied the four-part proportionality test in Bank Mellat v Her Majesty’s Treasury (No 2) [2013] UKSC 39, [2014] AC 700. Having accepted that it was appropriate, when applying the third and fourth criteria in the context of the facts of the present case, to apply a close standard of scrutiny, the Divisional Court rejected all the substantive submissions of the Appellant on this issue. They concluded (at [101])