03/02/2020 Economou v David De Freitas (Rev 1) [2016] EWHC 1853 (QB) (27 July 2016) 57. As I have indicated, Responsibility is accepted by Mr de Freitas in respect of all the words complained of in the November publications. I have to consider Identification, Meaning, and Serious Harm in relation to each of those publications, which I shall take in turn. The First Guardian Article 58. Mr Economou's case is that he was and was understood to be "the individual referred to by" the words attributed to Mr de Freitas in the First Guardian Article. He complains that the natural and ordinary meanings of those words was that he had (1) prosecuted Ms de Freitas for perverting the course of justice on a false basis; and (2) therefore is guilty of the rape of Ms de Freitas. It is helpful to start with what defamatory meaning(s) the ordinary reasonable reader would take away from the words used by Mr de Freitas, as quoted in the article, and then to consider whether Mr Economou was identified as the subject of such meaning(s). 59. I do not consider that the reasonable reader would understand these words to bear the meanings complained of. At the risk of over-elaboration I shall explain why. The words have as their focus Eleanor de Freitas, the police, the CPS, and Mr de Freitas. They do not contain any assertion about the person Ms de Freitas accused of raping her. To that extent Mr Barca QC is right in my judgment to submit that the words complained of are "not about him" and that he "is not being criticised". That is not a complete answer, however. As defamation lawyers know, words that are "about" one person can impliedly defame another. An example, albeit an old-fashioned one, was given in Morgan v Odhams Press (above) at 1243: to say that X is illegitimate would impliedly defame X's mother. See also the well-known case of Cassidy v Daily Mirror [1929] 2 KB 331, 338-8 (Scrutton LJ). Mr Barnes' argument follows similar lines, and needs to be considered. He submits: (1) that the statement in paragraph [5] that the police "did not believe there to be a case against" Ms de Freitas is "the plainest allegation that [Mr Economou's] prosecution was false for want of evidence against [her]"; (2) that the suggestion in paragraph [6] was that she was prosecuted because her evidence was in some way inconsistent, thereby implying "that there was no proper evidence against her"; and (3) that the overall implication is that Ms de Freitas' allegation of rape was sound, and was only not pursued for technical reasons. 60. It is reasonable to argue that Mr de Freitas' words implied something about the accused man, even though they were not "about" him in the sense outlined above. But there are problems with this line of argument. The first is that it is illogical to jump from the proposition that (applying the repetition rule) there was no case against Ms de Freitas for PCJ to the proposition that the man she accused was guilty of rape. A conviction for PCJ requires proof to the exacting criminal standard that the accuser lied. A person can make a false but honest allegation of rape. Ordinary readers do not always apply logic, but the fair-minded reader, not avid for scandal, would realise that the one does not follow from the other. Secondly, the context reinforces this point on the facts of the particular case, in two ways. One is the emphasis, prominent in the article, that Ms de Freitas was "suffering from a psychiatric illness" (paragraph [2]). The other important piece of context is in paragraph [14] where the reader is told that that, following the arrest and interview of the man accused the police took no further action, as they did not consider that there was a realistic prospect of conviction. Thirdly, the reader would apply some discount to the version of the grieving father. Fourth, Mr de Freitas said nothing about the conduct of the private prosecution. He was talking about the CPS. It was Ms Laville who told the reader about the private prosecution, in her paragraphs [1] and [15]. Mr Economou does not seek to hold Mr de Freitas responsible for those parts of the article. He cannot sue him for a natural and ordinary defamatory meaning that arises, if at all, only from (or as a result of) information contained in those parts of the article. 61. In my judgment the words complained of in the First Guardian Article did convey an implied natural and ordinary defamatory meaning about the man whom Ms de Freitas accused, but it was a more limited meaning than those complained of. The ordinary reasonable reader would draw from this article the meaning that there were reasonable grounds to suspect that the man accused by Eleanor de Freitas was guilty of her rape. The reader is told that an accusation was made, and led to the man's arrest and www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2016/1853.htm 16/58