No. 14-5123 Page 5 Huff, et al. v. Spaw II. JURISDICTION Because the communications that were intercepted took place outside of the United States, we first consider whether it was proper for the district court to exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. There is a “legal presumption that Congress ordinarily intends its statutes to have domestic, not extraterritorial, application” unless the “statutory language, context, history, or purpose show the contrary.” Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 388–89, 391 (2005). There are no such contrary indications with respect to Title III. Courts have repeatedly applied the general “legal presumption” against extraterritorial application to Title III. See United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 492 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Title III has no extraterritorial force.”); see also United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 279–80 (2d Cir. 1974). When determining whether an alleged interception is extraterritorial, and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of federal courts as a question arising under Title III, we do not consider whether the plaintiffs are citizens of the United States, Stowe v. Devoy, 588 F.2d 336, 341 n.11 (2d Cir. 1978), or whether the communications traveled through United States telecommunication infrastructure, United States v. Cotroni, 527 F.2d 708, 711 (2d Cir. 1975). Instead, we look to “where the interception took place.” Ibid.; see also Stowe, 588 F. 2d at 341 n.12. Title III defines interception as “the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4). The relevant location is not where the Huffs’ conversations took place, but where Spaw used a device to acquire the contents of those conversations. Because Spaw used her office phone and an iPhone in Covington, Kentucky, there is no extraterritoriality that would bar the application of Title III. Accordingly, the district court properly exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. III. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Frazier v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 431 F.3d 563, 565 (6th Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The question is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided