-34publication rule in relation to a person who plays a less important role in the publication process and thus does not know the content being published or can do nothing to prevent its publication. Conversely, if the person concerned was aware of the article’s content and had the opportunity to prevent its dissemination, there is no reason in principle for excluding the strict publication rule. 86. The ability to exercise such control was central to the decision in Thompson v Australian Capital TV Ltd.70 As noted above, Channel 7 was held liable as a first or main publisher for re-broadcasting live to air the defamatory programme produced by Channel 9 since it was clear that Channel 7 had had the ability and opportunity to prevent publication of the defamatory content but had decided not to exercise such control. In the main judgment, their Honours stated: “It is true that Channel 7 did not participate in the production of the original material constituting the program. But Channel 7 had the ability to control and supervise the material it televised. Channel 7's answer is that time did not permit monitoring the content of the program between its receipt at Black Mountain and its telecast from the studios in the Australian Capital Territory. That may well be so but it by no means follows that Channel 7 was merely a conduit for the program and hence a subordinate disseminator. It was Channel 7's decision that the telecast should be near instantaneous, a decision which was understandable given the nature and title of the program but which was still its decision.”71 87. In Bunt v Tilley, Eady J pointed to knowledge and control (meaning “an opportunity to prevent the publication”) as the basis for allocating responsibility:72 “In determining responsibility for publication in the context of the law of defamation, it seems to me to be important to focus on what the person did, or failed to do, in the chain of communication. It is clear that the state of a defendant's knowledge can be an important factor. If a person knowingly permits another to communicate information which is defamatory, when there would be an opportunity to prevent the 70 (1996) 186 CLR 574. 71 Per Brennan CJ, Dawson and Toohey JJ, at 589-590. 72 [2007] 1 WLR 1243 at §21.