-22being deemed not to have published at all. For the reasons previously given,46 I do not accept that premise. Nor am I able to accept the distinction drawn between the notice board and graffiti analogies, nor the suggestion that “the provision of a platform for blogs is equivalent to the provision of a notice board”. 47 As indicated above, my view is that the provider of an internet discussion platform similar to that provided by the respondents falls from the outset within the broad traditional concept of “a publisher”, a characteristic not shared by a golf club or other occupier who puts up a notice board on which a trespassing message is posted. 54. I pause to note in passing that there is rightly no suggestion in the present case that the providers of a discussion platform like the respondents should be regarded as “mere conduits” or “passive facilitators” comparable to the Post Office or a telephone company, as has sometimes been argued in certain internet cases.48 H. Publication and the internet 55. The crucial questions in this appeal are therefore whether the respondents are subordinate publishers entitled to rely on the common law defence of innocent dissemination and, if so, whether they have, on the facts, made out that defence. For these questions to be properly addressed it is necessary to consider the nature of publication on the internet in cases like the present. 46 In Section D. 47 [2013] EMLR 14 at §33. I also do not, with respect, subscribe to the analysis of this line of cases adopted by Dr Matthew Collins in “The Law of Defamation and the Internet” (OUP 3rd Ed) at §6.29-§6.34. 48 Godfrey v Demon Internet Ltd [2001] QB 201 at 209-210; Tsichlas v Touch Line Media Pty Ltd 2004 (2) SA 112 at 123; Bunt v Tilley [2007] 1 WLR 1243 at §37; Tamiz v Google Inc [2013] EMLR 14 (CA) at §23; Wishart v Murray [2013] NZHC 540 at §110, §117.