¶ 136 The majority concludes “[c]ivil actions are inadequate” and cites law review articles in support (supra ¶¶ 73-76), but we should “not assume plausible alternatives will fail to protect compelling interests; there must be some basis in the record, in legislative findings or otherwise, establishing the law enacted as the least restrictive means.” Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 518 U.S. 727, 807 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Ginsburg, J.); see also Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 492 U.S. 115, 128-30 (1989) (noting “the congressional record contains no legislative findings that would justify us in concluding that there is no constitutionally acceptable less restrictive means, short of a total ban, to achieve the Government’s interest in protecting minors”). Moreover, “it is the Government’s obligation to prove that the alternative will be ineffective to achieve its goals” (Playboy, 529 U.S. at 816), and the State has not done so here. ¶ 137 Laws burdening speech based on its content are subjected to “the most exacting scrutiny.” Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994); People v. Jones, 188 Ill. 2d 352, 358 (1999). Here, the statute cannot withstand strict scrutiny, as it is not narrowly tailored to serve the State’s interests and less restrictive alternatives are available. Thus, I would find the statute unconstitutional and affirm the circuit court’s judgment. ¶ 138 JUSTICE THEIS joins in this dissent. - 43 -