05/02/2020 2016 ONCJ 35 (CanLII) | CanLII that Mr. Elliott was tweeting and what he was saying is relevant to the reasonableness of the fear. I have discussed this in dealing with whether Mr. Elliott knew that Ms. Guthrie was harassed. The main premise that I find unreasonable is her perception that she could tweet about topics but not be exposed to his tweets (however spurious and invalid) about the same topic – even if the topic was him. All of Mr. Elliott’s tweets at issue were responses to the attacks on him that I have listed, or a return to the original dinner and the Bendilin Spurr dispute. I say “all” his tweets because Crown counsel does not rely on the content of any one tweet to suggest harassment. His not letting go of a topic is stubborn and may be considered childish, but it does not provide a basis for a recipient of his tweets to fear danger, especially if the recipient is herself still making negative comments about the sender. Another premise of Ms. Guthrie’s is that Mr. Elliott was not allowed to tweet using hashtags that she created, was closely associated with or followed. But he was. She held a view of hashtags and Twitter that is she is entitled to but, according to this evidence, is not reasonable. The effect of P.C. Dayler’s evidence on this point is that a hashtag is open to the world. Another important circumstance is what occurred after Ms. Guthrie unblocked Mr. Elliott and told him to stop contacting her. Leaving aside his hashtag tweets, he did so until November 5. I have reviewed his six November tweets and the exchange that @CromartyHeather commenced using #AOTID. Ms. Guthrie testified that made her afraid. Her basis was that he seemed obsessed and fixated; i.e., she was afraid by the very fact that he tweeted. It is reasonable that fear can arise just from the fact of someone continuing to contact someone after being asked to stop. That behaviour could reasonably signify that the person who continued the contact was capable of anything since they ignored the request. Findings of reasonable fear are made on just that basis; I have done so myself in criminal harassment trials. But in this case, Ms. Guthrie’s unreasonable premise that Mr. Elliott was irrational and had nothing valid to say meant that she never put his tweets into any context. The very fact of his tweeting any hashtag she followed or any tweet about her or with her handle harassed her. She would not even allow for the possibility that he had any reason apart from the obsession with her that she perceived to tweet about her. Given that she had a leadership role in the campaign to denounce him, that is not reasonable. I do not restrict this consideration to physical safety, as s. 264 can include psychological safety. Though Crown counsel argued that as a basis of Ms. Guthrie’s fear, I did not interpret her fear of danger to mean that. She particularly cited his knowing the neighbourhood in which she lived, and there is no evidence that she feared for her psychological safety. But that fear must also be reasonable. At this point I have already determined that Ms. Guthrie was harassed by the repeated communication. Had there been anything in the tweets of a violent or sexual nature or that indicated the irrationality that Ms. Guthrie perceived, that could support a fear of danger on the basis that he would be capable of anything. But as I have discussed in relation to knowledge, I have reviewed all of the tweets – despite Crown counsel and Ms. Guthrie not relying on any one tweet – and found no such tweet. The element that the fear be reasonable in all of the circumstances has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt. The charge is dismissed.   ANALYSIS: Heather Reilly Repeated communication Mr. Elliott communicated directly with Ms. Reilly during the period set out in the information, August 1 to November 20. He used her handle when he expressed disbelief about her request to stop following her feed, called her “fucking nuts”, and told her that “This is Twitter” and that her request that he stop replying to her posts offended his “sensibilities”. He used her handle again when he replied to her retweets by asking how she would feel if he was so delusional as to ask her not to retweet him. Just those two communications amount to repeated communications. He also communicated with Ms. Reilly indirectly during the period, by mentioning her. I discount any of the tweets in which Mr. Elliott used a hashtag such as #TOpoli for the reasons given above in discussing hashtags, but such tweets form almost no part of Ms. Reilly’s complaint against Mr. Elliott. file:///Users/nerissa/Downloads/Columbia CSV/R v Gregory Allan Elliott.htm 39/43