- 37 A B A certain extent” the information stored in the computer can be treated as a B separate place. C D C 90. This cannot be regarded as an authority to support a general D proposition that all the information contained in a mobile phone E F (comparable to a computer) should be treated as contained at a separate place from the mobile phone itself. Without more, it provides no E F support to the contentions that, for the purposes of section 50(6), the G H digital information of a mobile phone seized at the place of arrest should be treated as at a separate place. I 91. J Further, it also cannot be said it must be the case that all the digital information one can access through a mobile phone is not stored in G H I J it. Of course, one can understand that there could be information say K K saved in a remote server that could be accessed through the phone. But L there could also be some information that can be regarded as having been L saved and stored in the phone’s memory chip itself. In other words, as M M observed by Karakatsanis J in Fearon at paragraphs 127 - 131, the phone N O P Q R S T itself could store and keep the private information, and also act as a “portal” to information and data saved and stored in a remote server: “[127] However, a cell phone cannot be treated like any other piece of physical evidence that may be found on an arrestee and searched incident to arrest. The analogy to a ‘briefcase’ is not apt. in R. v. Vu, 2013 SCC 60, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 657, at paras. 38 and 47, this Court recognized that a computer or cell phone is fundamentally unlike a conventional ‘receptacl[e]’. the four reasons Cromwell J. identified in that case are equally applicable here. [128] First, computers and cell phones store immense amounts of information, some of which will be highly private in nature (Vu, at para. 41). In the case of a cell phone, this will include private communications in the form of texts and N O P Q R S T U U V V