05/02/2020 Galloway v Frazer & Ors [2016] NIQB 7 (27 January 2016) "Insomuch as the application is made ex parte, full and fair disclosure is necessary, as in all ex parte applications, and a failure to make such full and fair disclosures should justify the court in discharging the order, even though the party might afterwards be in a position to make another application." There are numerous other authorities stressing the importance of the applicant seeking leave ex parte making sure that everything relevant is disclosed to the trial judge and stressing that an application for service out of the jurisdiction should be approached cautiously and with great care. These requirements are linked. They are there to ensure that the court does not assume jurisdiction over a foreign natural or company unwisely or unfairly. These authorities hold good today. The courts should be very slow indeed on an application for leave to serve out of the jurisdiction to allow a plaintiff to profit from an order obtained in the absence of full disclosure. It remains of paramount importance that full disclosure should be made, and that the court can expect to proceed on the basis that counsel has put before it on an ex parte application for leave all relevant material. [37] The Supreme Court Practice Volume 1 1991 at 11/1/10 states: "1. Case must fall within the rule. The applicant for leave must show that his case falls clearly within one or other of the sub-paras of r. 1(1). In the application of this principle: (a) The applicant must choose which sub-paragraphs of R. 1(1) to rely on: (ii) In order for the plaintiff to obtain leave he must make a good arguable case that each claim falls within one or other of the grounds specified in Order 11 Rule 1(1), that is the gateways that permit service to be affected on a defendant outside the jurisdiction. The following points must be considered: (a) The applicant must choose which sub-paragraphs of Rule 1(1) to rely on; the sub-paragraphs are, generally speaking, to be read disjunctively (Matthews v Kuwait Bechtel Corp [1959] 2 QB 57). (b) The case must fall within the spirit as well as the letter of the Order (Johnston v Taylor Bros & Co [1920] AC 144 at 153); (c) The court must decide upon the application itself whether the case falls within Order 11; it can grant leave on terms, or as to part of the claim only, but cannot leave the question of whether the case falls within the Order to be determined at the trial (Vitkovice Horni v Korner [1951] AC 869); (d) The court must decide upon the application on the basis of the cause or causes of action expressly mentioned in the writ of summons. The plaintiff will not be allowed to rely on an alternative cause of action if he seeks to spell out of the facts pleaded, such cause of action that had not been so mentioned: (Metall und Rohstoff AG v Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Inc [1990] 1 QB 391) and DSQ Property Co Ltd v Lotus Cars Limited [1990] The Time June 28 CA: see 11/1/10 of Volume 1 of the Supreme Court Practice 1999." (This advice at (d) must now be considered in the light of the comments of the Supreme Court in MNL Capital Ltd v Argentina 2011 UKSC 31 discussed later on in this judgment at paragraphs 47, 48 and 49.) [38] The good arguable case required in respect of the gateways has been discussed in a number of authorities. It means that the courts will require something more than a mere prima facie case. While file:///Users/nerissa/Downloads/Columbia CSV/Galloway v Frazer & Ors [2016] NIQB 7 (27 January 2016).htm 10/26