05/02/2020 Galloway v Frazer & Ors [2016] NIQB 7 (27 January 2016) contents specified in the schedule was to be prohibited. The injunction(s) is so widely drawn as to be impossible to enforce. If the schedule referred to in the writ is intended to refer to the schedules attached to the draft statement of claim, then it captures much innocent material such as the defendant saying in URL4 that the people of Cluan Place are not going to be blackmailed by Sinn Fein over welfare cuts. Again on URL3 there are requests for donations to help the defendant fight legal proceedings brought by the plaintiff. No attempt whatsoever has been made to define the objectionable material that Google is to be prevented from republishing. Stephens J was not informed, as he should have been, that it is not possible to obtain an injunction to restrict the viewing of alleged defamatory material in other jurisdictions. "It is not for the court to restrict publications outside its jurisdiction": see KJO v XIAM [2011] EWHC 1768 (QB) at [24]. Duncan and Neill on Defamation (4th Edition) at 9.09 state relying on Berezovsky v Michaels [2006] 1 WLR 1004 that: "If permission to serve out (of the jurisdiction) is required, the claimant must limit his claim to publication occurring in (Northern Ireland), even if the defendant was also responsible for publication of the same matter elsewhere." [33] It is not at all clear what causes of action passed through what gateway(s) in respect of the application for leave. It is not possible to determine what cause of action, if any, passed through Order 11(1)(b) ("The Injunction Gateway"). Or what causes of action, if any, passed through Order 11(1)(c) ("The necessary and proper party gateway"). Nor can it be determined what cause of action, if any, passed through Order 11(1)(f) ("The tort gateway"). [34] The Order itself refers only to Order 11 Rule 1 and gives leave to serve "a generally endorsed writ of summons outside the jurisdiction". However, it is simply not possible that the judge could have given leave in respect of all the different gateways claimed under Order 11 Rule 1 as in some places they were clearly not relied upon. There were no submissions made in respect of malicious falsehood. There was no evidence before the court in respect of malice. The cause of action was never opened to the Judge and it was formally abandoned by the plaintiff in a letter from his solicitors dated 26 January 2015 well after the leave was granted. For example, it will be noted that Order 11 Rule 1(1)(a) relates exclusively to land. Furthermore, some of the causes of action disclosed no triable issue eg see the claim for damages for malicious falsehood referred to above. If the Judge granted leave for the entire Writ of Summons then for reasons which will appear later in the judgment, junior counsel should have pointed out to him the difficulties, for example, in making a case for slander: see 3.12 of Gatley on Libel and Slander (12th ed) which makes it clear that defamatory publications on the internet constitute libel by virtue of s. 201(1)(b) of the Broadcasting Act. Even on the most generous consideration of the facts, slander was never a cause of action which the plaintiff was entitled to rely upon. However, for the sake of completeness, the court will consider the possibility, albeit remote, that leave was granted for the cause of actions captured in the Writ of Summons as drafted at that time. LEAVE TO SERVE OUT OF THE JURISDICTION [35] The plaintiff in this case relies it would seem on Order 11 Rule 1(1)(b), (c) and (f). These provisions state: "Principal cases in which service of writ out of jurisdiction is permissible 1. – (1) Provided that the writ does not contain any claim mentioned in Order 75 rule 2(1) and is not a writ to which paragraph (2) of this rule applies, service of a writ or notice of a writ out of the jurisdiction is permissible with the leave of the Court if in the action begun by the writ… (b) an injunction is sought ordering the defendant to do or refrain from doing anything within the jurisdiction (whether or not damages are also claimed in respect of a failure to do or the doing of that thing); file:///Users/nerissa/Downloads/Columbia CSV/Galloway v Frazer & Ors [2016] NIQB 7 (27 January 2016).htm 8/26