restrictions are subject to intermediate scrutiny, which demands that the law governmental be "narrowly interest." tailored Id. to serve "[U]nlike a a significant content-based restriction of speech, [a content-neutral regulation] 'need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of' serving the government's interests." McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2535 (2014) (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 798). We reach the conclusion that the statute at issue here is facially scrutiny. 4 unconstitutional even applying only intermediate See, e.g., McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1446 (2014)("Because we find a substantial mismatch between the Government's stated objective and the means selected to achieve it, the aggregate limits fail even under the 'closely drawn' test. We therefore need not parse the differences between the two standards in this case."). Like in McCutcheon, there is a substantial mismatch between New Hampshire's objectives and the ballot-selfie prohibition in section 659:35, I.5 4 The district court chose to rely on reasoning that section 659:35, I is a content-based restriction. Rideout, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 229. To reach this conclusion, it relied heavily on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Reed. Id. at 228–29. Secretary Gardner vigorously contests this conclusion. As the statute fails even intermediate scrutiny, we need not resolve the question of whether section 659:35, I is a content-based regulation. 5 Because the statute fails under intermediate scrutiny, we also need not reach the plaintiffs' argument that the statute fails under the overbreadth doctrine. See, e.g., United States - 13 -