¶ 12 ¶ 13 ¶ 14 ¶ 15 ¶ 16 ¶ 17 be considered an opinion. Accordingly, the circuit court held that Rule 224 relief should be granted. The court directed Comcast to provide the identification and last known address of the holder of the IP address. The court also stayed its order pending the appeal process. The appellate court affirmed, with one justice dissenting. 2014 IL App (2d) 130489. The appellate court first concluded that Fuboy had standing to contest the circuit court order since he or she had an interest in the proceedings, i.e., to remain anonymous. Id. ¶ 12. After adopting the analysis for Rule 224 in connection with defamation claims as set forth in Stone and Maxon v. Ottawa Publishing Co., 402 Ill. App. 3d 704 (2010) (2014 IL App (2d) 130489, ¶ 15), the court rejected Fuboy’s contention that Hadley’s defamation claim would not survive a section 2-615 motion to dismiss. The appellate court agreed with the circuit court’s conclusion that Fuboy’s statement was defamatory per se because it imputed the commission of a crime; that it was not reasonably capable of an innocent construction; and that it could reasonably be interpreted as stating an actual fact. Id. ¶ 21. Therefore, the appellate court held the circuit court did not err in granting Rule 224 relief (id. ¶ 13). We granted Fuboy’s petition for leave to appeal. ANALYSIS Whether Hadley’s Original Complaint Was a Legal Nullity Fuboy initially contends that the circuit court should not have granted Hadley relief under Rule 224 because Hadley would not be able to bring a defamation suit within the one year statute of limitations for that offense. Citing to Bogseth v. Emanuel, 166 Ill. 2d 507 (1995), Fuboy maintains that a complaint which uses a fictitious name for a defendant is a legal nullity. According to Fuboy, Hadley’s original complaint, filed on August 7, 2012, used a fictitious name and, therefore, was of no legal effect. From this, Fuboy maintains that Hadley’s amended complaint could not relate back to the original complaint (since it legally did not exist) and, therefore, any action against Fuboy is barred by the statute of limitations. We disagree. In Bogseth, plaintiffs in two cases filed complaints naming as the sole defendant “John Doe” and naming other parties as respondents in discovery. The legal question presented was whether a fictitious “John Doe” could be considered a “named defendant[ ]” as required under section 2-402 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-402 (West 1992)), the respondent in discovery statute. Answering that question in the negative, this court observed that the general rule in Illinois is that suits brought against fictitious parties are legally invalid or without legal effect. Bogseth, 166 Ill. 2d at 513-14. We then held that a plaintiff must name at least one “real person or entity as a defendant” (id. at 513) before the procedures afforded by the respondent in discovery statute could be invoked. The plaintiffs’ complaints in Bogseth were invalid because they failed to “commence[ ] an action against an identifiable, real person or entity.” Id. Bogseth is distinguishable. In that case, the plaintiffs chose to use the placeholder “John Doe” to sue defendants who were unknown and unidentifiable. Here, in contrast, Hadley knew that an individual named Fuboy had made the statements on the Freeport Journal Standard’s website. Hadley did not make up a fictitious name to identify an unknown defendant. Instead, Fuboy was defendant’s validly assumed alias and Hadley simply filed suit against that alias. There is a significant difference, in our view, between a plaintiff suing an unknown John Doe and a plaintiff suing a known defendant using an alias adopted of the defendant’s own volition. -4-