Neutral Citation Number: 2023:DHC:2806 intermediaries with policing and monitoring of content under the garb of “due diligence”, and that Rule 3(1)(d) affirms that an intermediary ought to take down content only upon receipt of the Court order or order from government agency. This has been clarified by the Executive vide FAQs dated 01.11.2021 whereby it is stated that the communication between the authorities to the intermediary should contain “platform specific identified URLs” and “justification and evidence”. Thus, Orders for disablement of content have to be qua specific URLs and intermediaries are not expected to proactively sift through unlimited content to determine its legitimacy; their role must be neutral and not reactive [Refer to Muskan Jattana v. Union of India, W.P.(Crl.) 956 of 2021and Vandana Pal v. Union of India, W.P.(Crl.) 1669/2021]. Further, proactive monitoring would lead to the intermediary losing immunity/safe harbour protection provided under Section 79. Moreover, this Court in Anchit Chawla v. Google India, W.P.(C) 13921/2018, has recognised that Orders only against search engines are futile, and directions need to be passed against actual publishers to ensure holistic removal of content. Allowing intermediaries to apply its own mind to adjudge the legitimacy of online content will lead to chilling free speech, over-blocking as well as circumventing the fundamental right of online speech of third-parties. It would also undermine the right to privacy of users, which has been recognized by the Supreme Court, whose personal or sensitive personal data/information would be interfered with, and it would go against various decisions of the Supreme Court where blanket orders or precensorship of content was held to be illegal. Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:SHAZAAD ZAKIR Signing Date:26.04.2023 17:19:50 W.P.(CRL) 1505/2021 Page 49 of 88