GLUKHIN v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT – identification of target persons and vehicles by video-surveillance systems on checkpoints at the boundaries of the security zone and its subzones and on parts of the underground essential for its functioning; – detection and identification of target events by video-surveillance systems at any time and place inside the underground, including in unlimited access subzones, subzones with ticket access and on parts of the underground essential for its functioning; – detection of target persons and vehicles by video-surveillance systems at any time and place in the “for staff only” subzones of the underground; – detection of target persons and vehicles by video-surveillance systems at a specific time and place on the perimeter of the security zone; – real-time transmission of data; – storage of data on electronic devices for at least thirty days; – real-time detection of an offender trying to access the underground outside the checkpoints on the perimeter of the security zone and on parts of the underground essential for its functioning; – registration and real-time transmission of data about staff and passengers crossing the boundaries of the subzones with ticket access, “for staff only” subzones and accessing parts of the underground essential for its functioning (Article 6 § 1). 34. Competent agencies of the Federal Security Service, the police and the Federal Transport Supervision Service were to have access to the data obtained by the transport security systems (Article § 5 (10)). RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL MATERIAL I. UNITED NATIONS 35. The relevant parts of the report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights of 24 June 2020 entitled “Impact of new technologies on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of assemblies, including peaceful protests” (UN Doc. A/HRC/44/24) read as follows (footnotes omitted): “33. The use of facial recognition technology to identify persons in the context of assemblies has considerable adverse effects on the rights to privacy, freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, if effective safeguards are not in place. A person’s image constitutes one of the key attributes of her or his personality as it reveals unique characteristics distinguishing her or him from other persons. Recording, analysing and retaining someone’s facial images without her or his consent constitute interferences with a person’s right to privacy. By deploying facial recognition technology at assemblies, these interferences occur on a mass and indiscriminate scale, as this requires the collection and processing of facial images of all persons captured by the camera equipped with or connected to a facial recognition technology system. 34. Assemblies traditionally have allowed participants a certain level of protection against being singled out or identified. This protection was already considerably 7