03/02/2020 Hegglin v Person(s) Unknown & Anor [2014] EWHC 2808 (QB) (31 July 2014) problem, Google has been taking steps to remove offending content from Google-hosted sites and to block URLs linking to the offending material which appear on its search results. He disputes that an injunction is necessary as a matter of practical reality. 15. I do not accept this submission. Google has indeed been co-operative rather than obstructive, but the question of whether it is doing all that it can, or all that can be done, to prevent re-publication of this offensive material is an issue for trial. 16. The claimant's cause of action for the statutory torts created by the Data Protection Act is clearly established in principle and there is at least a good arguable case for the grant of some form of injunction against the second defendant. What the width of that injunction should be is a question for trial. 17. I asked Mr. Caldecott whether he was aware of any case in which the decision on whether to give leave to serve out of the jurisdiction depended on the width of the injunction claimed or the width of the injunction which the court finds will probably be obtained at trial, and he was not able to do so. 18. I also hold that, on the information presently available to me, England is, in all the circumstances, clearly or distinctly the appropriate forum for the trial of this dispute and the forum in which the case can be suitably tried in the interests of all parties and for the ends of justice. "3. 1(9) A claim is made in tort where (a) damage was sustained within the jurisdiction; or (b) the damage sustained resulted from an act committed within the jurisdiction." 19. As I have noted, the claimant has business interests as well as a home within the jurisdiction, and the defamatory material damages or risks damaging his reputation here. As for Google, this claim comes in the wake of the important decision of the European Court of Justice at Luxembourg in the Costeja González case. This established that Google Inc. is the data controller for the purposes of the European Directive in relation to its provision of web search facilities. The court held that Article 4(1) of the directive is satisfied when the operator of a search engine sets up in a Member State a branch or subsidiary intended to promote and sell advertising space offered by the search engine and which orientates its activity towards the inhabitants of that country. 20. I accept the submission of Mr. Tomlinson that, on this basis, there is at least a good arguable case that Google is under an obligation, enforceable in this jurisdiction, to comply with the requirements of the 1998 Act when processing the claimant's personal data, both when hosting a website on which such data appears or in the circumstances described in the ECJ's decision when operating a search engine such as goog1e.co.uk on which his data is processed. "3.1(3) necessary and proper party" 21. There is a lack of evidence at present as to whether the first defendant is or may be connected to this jurisdiction. Google were and remain willing to comply with any indication from me that a Norwich Pharmacal order would be justified without prejudice to their general arguments about service out of the jurisdiction. They raised no separate dispute under this heading; and clearly if leave to serve out of the jurisdiction is given, as I have given it, in respect of the substantive claim for an injunction, no separate issue arises in respect of the Norwich Pharmacal order. 22. For these reasons, I granted leave for the claim form to be served out of the jurisdiction on Google Inc. in respect of each of the causes of action in the claim (See separate transcript for proceedings after judgment) BAILII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2014/2808.html www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2014/2808.html 4/4