Lee Hsien Loong v Leong Sze Hian [2021] SGHC 66 defendant has not shown that the proceedings were mounted to serve some other collateral purpose. 82 The motivations and objectives of litigants would generally be multifarious. Litigation may be intended to remedy a breach of some obligation, but may also be intended to obtain vengeance for some slight, to punish the other party, or to teach the other side a lesson of some sort. The mere possibility or even existence of such other motivation does not, without more, colour the proceedings as being abusive. As has rightly been observed, albeit in the context of shareholder disputes, “it is not the law that only a plaintiff who feels goodwill towards a defendant is entitled to sue”: Swansson v R A Pratt Properties Pty Ltd [2002] 42 ACSR 313 at [41]. I do not see how it can be contended that the plaintiff is not in fact trying to vindicate his reputation – he has sought an apology for the defamatory words, and is now seeking damages in defamation. It is well-established in the law of defamation that damages can vindicate a plaintiff’s reputation, and that they must in fact be of a sufficient quantum to have that effect: Broome v Cassell and Co Ltd [1972] AC 1027 at 1071B–E (“Cassell and Co Ltd”), as applied in Tang Liang Hong v Lee Kuan Yew and another and other appeals [1997] 3 SLR(R) 576 at [128]. The Appropriate Remedies 83 The plaintiff sought two remedies: damages and an injunction. Damages 84 An award of damages would follow from a finding that defamation has occurred: [62] above. Damages in the context of defamation may be broadly separated into general and aggravated damages. As observed in Arul Chandran 46