Lee Hsien Loong v Leong Sze Hian [2021] SGHC 66 whether they are true or not, I accept that there is at least a prima facie case established that the defendant knew that the defamatory words were untrue. While the Article had referred to a quote from Ms Clare Rewcastle Brown, whom the defendant believed to be a respected investigative journalist who had played a role in uncovering the 1MDB scandal, that did not ipso facto absolve the defendant from verifying the veracity or otherwise of the Article before linking to it in his Post. It was, at the very least, reckless disregard of whether the Article was true or not for the defendant to have posted it without making any enquiries as to its truth whatsoever. In this regard, I was unassisted by the lack of any direct evidence from the defendant as to his state of mind, and am satisfied on the basis of the facts before me that his recklessness as to the truth of the Article may be inferred. 121 In any event, I am also satisfied that, when seen cumulatively with his refusal to apologise for the defamatory words, malice may be made out on the facts. However, a further significant question is the extent of the malice – any uplift to the damages on the facts will be tempered by the fact that the malice in this case, unlike in several of the other cases cited to me, did not involve a defendant wilfully posting something he knew to be false at the time of posting, nor did it involve a defendant who defiantly insisted on the truth of his libellous claims to the bitter end despite clear evidence to the contrary. Other factors 122 The plaintiff also argued that the Court should take into account the “natural indignation of the court” in determining the appropriate quantum of damages. Cases such as Lim Eng Hock Peter v Lin Jian Wei and another and another appeal [2010] 4 SLR 357 at [7] and Lee Kuan Yew and another v Tang Liang Hong and others and other actions [1997] 2 SLR(R) 81 at [86] were cited 65