Lee Hsien Loong v Leong Sze Hian [2021] SGHC 66 for defamation must inevitably have an inhibiting effect on freedom of speech. 80 It may be argued that a similar principle should apply to politicians: That argument is, however, precluded by the Court of Appeal’s decision in Tang Liang Hong v Lee Kuan Yew and another and other appeals [1997] 3 SLR(R) 576 from [116] to [119]. In particular, the Court observed that: Clearly these two cases [Derbyshire and City of Chicago v Tribune Co (1923) 139NE 86] are distinguishable from the instant cases. In each of the two cases the party suing was a public authority and as a matter of policy the laws in those jurisdictions do not permit such an authority to bring an action for libel. In the cases before us, the plaintiffs are individuals suing as private citizens. None of them brought the actions in their official capacity. Even under English law, a prime minister of a minister in office may sue in their private capacity for damages in respect of defamatory matters published of them and depending on the circumstances may recover substantial damages. Mr Gray himself realises this crucial difference because, in the next breath, he says that Mr Tang “is not arguing that politicians should forfeit the right to protect their reputations by means of libel actions”. It was apparent in the present case that the plaintiff was suing in his own right. The suit is in his name and brings a claim for loss to his reputation. Crucially, nothing in the claim or arguments raised points to an attempt to vindicate anything other than the plaintiff’s own personal rights. Other collateral purposes 81 The defendant asserts that the plaintiff’s bringing of this suit has a dominant improper purpose “because the [p]laintiff is trying to silence a critic, not trying to vindicate his reputation”.34 I do not see how the plaintiff’s actions can be construed as “not trying to vindicate his reputation”. Quite simply, the 34 DCS at [5]. 45