03/02/2020 Privacy International v Secretary of State for Foreign And Commonwealth Affairs & Ors (Rev 2) [2016] UKIPTrib 15_110-CH (17 October 2016) also data which is in any event maintained and retained by [PECN's] for their own commercial purposes (particularly billing and fraud prevention). 14) Such data is of significant intelligence and security value." 11. In the recent Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner ("I C C"), Sir Stanley Burnton, being a Review of directions given under s.94 dated July 2016 ("the July Review"), the I C C stated at paragraph 8.34 that: "All of the current directions require regular feeds of bulk communications data to be disclosed by the relevant PECN." 12.   The MI5 witness explained at paragraph 25 of his statement:"The use of communications data (the who, where, when and how of a communication but not its content) is a vital tool in the investigation of threats and safeguarding the public. The DG for MI5 discussed the importance of communications data in meeting the challenges that the SIA's face in his BBC interview of 17th September 2015:"We need to be able to use datasets so we can join the dots, to be able to find and stop the terrorists who mean us harm before they are able to bring the plots to fruition.  We have been pretty successful at that in recent years but it is becoming more difficult to do that as technology changes faster and faster."" Avowal 13. 'Avowal' has become something of a term of art in the course of proceedings before this Tribunal, namely being the date when the Respondents have publicly avowed the activity the subject of consideration in the relevant proceedings.  In this case the existence of BPD was only avowed in March 2015, when disclosure was made to the ISC.  By a Direction dated 11th March 2015 (the Intelligence Services Commissioner Additional Review Functions) (Bulk Personal Datasets) Direction 2015) the Prime Minister, pursuant to his power under s.59(a) of RIPA, directed the Intelligence Services Commissioner ("I S Commissioner")  to, "continue to keep under review the acquisition, use, retention and disclosure by the [SIAs] of bulk personal datasets, as well as the adequacy of safeguards against misuse," and to "assure himself that the acquisition, use, retention and disclosure of bulk personal datasets does not occur except in accordance with," the relevant sections of the SSA 1989 and ISA 1994, and to "seek to assure himself of the adequacy of the [SIAs'] handling arrangements and their compliance therewith." 14. S.94 directions, and BCD, which had previously been disclosed to the ISC, were not publicly avowed until November 2015, when they were disclosed in the context of the draft Investigatory Powers Bill then being presented to Parliament. Although Sir Stanley Burnton's predecessor as I C C, Sir Anthony May, was asked in February 2015 by the Prime Minister to oversee the s.94 directions on a nonstatutory basis, and agreed to do so, provided that he was given extra staff, the I C C was not able effectively to start doing so until at least October 2015. 15. Handling Arrangements for BPD and for s.94 were both published on 4th November 2015, and were supplemented by Closed Handling Arrangements in relation to each of the SIAs, which have been subsequently, during the course of these proceedings, disclosed, redacted in part. The Issues 16. On 7th July 2016 the parties agreed an amended list of issues.  They are helpfully summarised in paragraph 11 of the Claimant's Skeleton:a) Issue 1: Section 94 TA under domestic law: Is it lawful as a matter of domestic law to use section 94 TA to obtain BCD? www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/format.cgi?doc=/uk/cases/UKIPTrib/2016/15_110-CH.html&query=([2016])+AND+(UKIPTrib)+AND+(15_110-CH) 6/53