03/02/2020 ARZTEKAMMER FUR WIEN AND DORNER v. AUSTRIA - 8895/10 (Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction) : Court (Fourth Section)) [201… powers, and its independence and institutional autonomy had been preserved (see Österreichischer Rundfunk v. Austria, no. 35841/02, § 53, 7 December 2006). 38. It is undisputed that the first applicant organisation exists by virtue of the legislature that thus provides its continued existence. Its legal status is therefore that of a public-law body and not an entity founded in accordance with private law. 39. The Court observes further that the structure of the first applicant organisation is provided for by law and that membership is compulsory. The relationship between the members and the governing body is defined by means of public law issued by the governing body, and is not subject to the jurisdiction of the civil courts. Even the enforcement of payment of contributions arrears is a matter governed by the Federal Law for the Enforcement of Administrative Orders. 40. Further, the Court observes that the mission of the first applicant organisation is prescribed by the Medical Practitioners Act as well. 41. As regards the nature of its activities, on one hand it is undisputed that the first applicant organisation may, in certain matters, act as a private entity, and can be held liable before the ordinary courts. On the other hand, there is agreement between the parties that the first applicant organisation exercises governmental powers and has a public service role in organising and managing the education of doctors and their access to employed and self-employed work. In exercising all these functions, it is under the supervision of other State authorities. All the chamber’s organs can be dismissed from office by the regional Government under the section 195b of the Medical Practitioners Act. 42. Moreover, the activities of the first applicant organisation are financed by compulsory and enforceable contributions of all medical practitioners in Austria (see para. 38). 43. The Court is not persuaded by the first appplicant organisation´s argument that in publishing the impugned article he did not exercise of any governmental powers within the meaning of Article 34. The impugned statement was clearly made in exercising the chambers public function. 44. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the first applicant organisation is not a “person, nongovernmental organisation or group of individuals” within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention. 45. In accordance with Article 35 § 3, it follows that the application is incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention. The Court must therefore reject the application of the first applicant organisation as inadmissible. B. The second applicant’s victim status 46. The Government further argued that the second applicant had acted as the president of the first applicant organisation, and therefore as the head of a governmental organisation. He had used the first applicant organisation’s website to publish his statement, and had done this to fulfil his duties towards doctors. His act should be regarded as governed by public law, and his application should therefore be declared inadmissible ratione personae. 47. The second applicant contested that argument and emphasised that the national courts had found that he had not acted within the sphere of the duties conferred by public law. Otherwise, the courts could not have prohibited him from repeating the statements in question. 48. The Court reiterates that the term “victim”, used in Article 34 of the Convention, denotes the person directly affected by the act or omission which is in issue (see Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], no. 38433/09, § 92, ECHR 2012). 49. In the present case, the courts prohibited the second applicant, a natural person, from repeating the statement that the F. company was ruthless towards third parties, in particular medical professionals, and from referring to the F. company as a “locust”, “locust company” or “locust fund”. It was undisputed in the course of the domestic proceedings that the second applicant hereby acted as a representative of the first applicant. However by addressing the court order explicitly also to the second www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2016/179.html 9/13