- 12 A B A as a publisher of the results produced by its search engine”,10 and hence B the question of innocent dissemination did not arise. C D C 23. In light of the different approaches adopted by Beach J in D Trkulja v Google Inc LLC and McCallum J in Bleyer, which are both first E F instance decisions, it is perhaps correct for Mansfield J to say in Rana v Google Australia11 that whether or not an internet search engine can be E F considered a publisher in defamation law “is not settled in Australia”. G H I am not persuaded McCallum J has said the last word in this evolving area of the law at least as applicable to this jurisdiction, and Trkulja v G H Google Inc LLC and A v Google New Zealand Ltd cannot be so lightly I I brushed aside. J J 24. K L Moreover, McCallum J followed Bunt v Tilley & ors, 12 Metropolitan International Schools Ltd v Designtechnicia Corporation13 and Tamiz v Google Inc,14 but in this jurisdiction the Court of Final K L 15 Appeal in Oriental Press Group Ltd & anor v Fevaworks Solutions Ltd M N O considered the Bryne v Deane approach unsuitable for dealing with internet intermediaries because they do participate in a real sense in the 10 P Q R 11 12 S 13 14 T 15 “The evidence before me establishes that there is no human input in the application of the Google search engine apart from the creation of the algorithm. I would respectfully disagree with the conclusion reached by Beach J in Trkulja that the performance of the function of the algorithm in that circumstance is capable of establishing liability as a publisher at common law. I would adopt the English line of authority to the effect that, at least prior to notification of a complaint (and on the strength of the evidence before me), Google Inc cannot be liable as a publisher of the results produced by its search engine.” – paragraph 83 of the judgment [2013] FCA 60 (2 February 2013) [2007] 1 WLR 1243 [2011] 1 WLR 1743 [2013] EMLR 14 at p 3081 [2013] 5 HKC 253 M N O P Q R S T U U V V