- 11 A B A proportionality principle in this jurisdiction. It is true that locally there B has been some previous judicial reluctance to follow Jameel (Yousef), but C D there is no judicial guidance at all on how the proportionality principle features in the post-CJR landscape. Indeed, according to Bleyer, there C D has been debate even in the Australian jurisdiction as to whether Jameel E F abuse of process is applicable, and McCallum J’s approach premised on the non-Jameel proportionality principle has not been adopted in E F Australian courts before. In such context, I see the force of Mr McCoy G H SC’s submissions that oversight (and more significantly, guidance) by the Court of Appeal on the balancing of the factors, especially in the G H post-CJR regime, that may encourage courts to put the brakes on costly I J and time-consuming defamation actions will be relevant and useful. I am persuaded this comes within the “some other reason in the interests I J of justice” limb for granting leave to appeal. K K L V. GROUND 2 L M 22. M Mr McCoy SC has laid emphasis on what I have described in the Decision as the passivity rule on the basis of the functionalities of N O Google Search which, according to Google Inc, demonstrate that it is a neutral tool. McCallum J in Bleyer accepted that Google Inc was not a N O publisher of the alleged injurious materials for the purpose of defamation P Q law. Her Honour declined to follow Trkulja v Google Inc LLC and chose to follow the English authorities on the basis there was no human P Q input in Google Search apart from setting it up in the first place, and “at R least prior to notification of a complaint …… Google Inc cannot be liable R S S T T U U V V