Page 7 47 In my view, the Cyanamid test [American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd., [1975] A.C. 396 (H.L.)], even with these slight modifications, is inappropriate to the circumstances presented here. The main reason for this is that Cyanamid, as well as the two other cases mentioned above [Manitoba (A.G.) v. Metropolitan Stores Ltd., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 110; RJR -- MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311], involved the commercial context in which the criteria of “balance of convenience” and “irreparable harm” had some measurable meaning and which varied from case to case. Moreover, where expression is unmixed with some other commercial purpose or activity, it is virtually impossible to use the second and third criteria without grievously undermining the right to freedom of expression contained in s. 2(b) of the Charter. The reason for this is that the speaker usually has no tangible or measurable interest other than the expression itself, whereas the party seeking the injunction will almost always have such an interest. This test developed in the commercial context stacks the cards against the non-commercial speaker where there is no tangible, immediate utility arising from the expression other than the freedom of expression itself. 48 The inappropriateness of the Cyanamid test is confirmed by the jurisprudence relating to injunctions against allegedly defamatory statements, in both England and Canada. In both countries, the Cyanamid test has been rejected for injunctions against dissemination of defamatory statements. [Emphasis in original.] [19] Instead, in the defamation context the plaintiff faces a much stricter test, as explained by Bastarache J. in his review of the jurisprudence at para. 49: In Rapp v. McClelland & Stewart Ltd. (1981), 34 O.R. (2d) 452, Griffiths J. attempted to define the precise threshold for the granting of an injunction in the following terms (at pp. 455-56): The guiding principle then is, that the injunction should only issue where the words complained of are so manifestly defamatory that any jury verdict to the contrary would be considered perverse by the Court of Appeal. To put it another way where it is impossible to say that a reasonable jury must inevitably find the words defamatory the injunction should not issue. . . . American Cyanamid . . . has not affected the well established principle in cases of libel that an interim injunction should not be granted unless the jury would inevitably come to the conclusion that the words were defamatory. This passage has recently been cited with approval in the Quebec Court of Appeal in Champagne v. Collège d'enseignement général et professionnel (CEGEP) de Jonquière, [1997] R.J.Q. 2395. Rothman J.A., on this point speaking on behalf of Delisle and Robert JJ.A., went on to comment on the constitutional dimension of these common law approaches to the use of the injunctive power (at pp. 2402-3): 2015 BCSC 1024 (CanLII) Niemela v. Malamas