Case: 21-51178 Document: 00516474571 Page: 15 Date Filed: 09/16/2022 No. 21-51178 Platforms’ “discriminat[ion] against Americans and in favor of foreign adversaries” and censorship of even a congressional hearing that featured disfavored viewpoints. The Platforms do not directly engage with any of these concerns. Instead, their primary contention—beginning on page 1 of their brief and repeated throughout and at oral argument—is that we should declare HB 20 facially invalid because it prohibits the Platforms from censoring “pro-Nazi speech, terrorist propaganda, [and] Holocaust denial[s].” Red Br. at 1. Far from justifying pre-enforcement facial invalidation, the Platforms’ obsession with terrorists and Nazis proves the opposite. The Supreme Court has instructed that “[i]n determining whether a law is facially invalid,” we should avoid “speculat[ing] about ‘hypothetical’ or ‘imaginary’ cases.” Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 449–50. Overbreadth doctrine has a “tendency . . . to summon forth an endless stream of fanciful hypotheticals,” and this case is no exception. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 301 (2008). But it’s improper to exercise the Article III judicial power based on “hypothetical cases thus imagined.” Raines, 362 U.S. at 22; cf. SinenengSmith, 140 S. Ct. at 1585–86 (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining the tension between overbreadth adjudication and the constitutional limits on judicial power). If we focus instead on “the statute’s facial requirements,” Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 450, its language renders implausible many of the Platforms’ extreme hypothesized applications of the law. HB 20 expressly permits the Platforms to censor any unlawful expression and certain speech that “incites criminal activity or consists of specific threats”—not to mention any content the Platforms are authorized to censor by federal law. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 143A.006(a). So at a minimum, we should avoid “determin[ing] the constitutionality of [HB 20] in hypothetical 15